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INTRODUCTION: THE HIGH VALUE OF A REVERSE-MORALS CLAUSE
A close examination of the endorsement relationship be-
tween Enron Corporation ("Enron") and the Houston Astros be-
tween 1999 and 2001 sheds light on an emerging and vital part of
the entertainment contract in the twenty-first century - the re-
verse-morals clause. We define a reverse-morals clause as a recip-
' In the few times that the concept of a reverse-morals clause has appeared in legal litera-
ture, we see that concept being interchangeable with the following terms, in some varia-
tion or another: reverse-morality clause, bilateral-morals clause, reverse-moral-turpitude
clause, bilateral-moral-turpitude clause, ethics clause, and morals clause.
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rocal contractual warranty to a traditional morals clause'^ intended
to protect the reputation of talent' from the negative, unethical,
immoral, a n d / o r criminal behavior of the endorsee-company or
purchaser of talent's endorsement. Such a clause gives talent the
reciprocal right to terminate an endorsement contract based on
such defined negative conduct. As an illustration, if pre-scandal^
Tiger Woods' or New York Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter's con-
tract with Gillette were to have a reverse-morals clause, then
Woods or Jeter could sever his endorsement contract and poten-
tially recoup money damages against Gillette if the company failed
We define a traditional morals clause as follows:
A contractual provision that gives one contracting party (usually a company) the
unilateral right to terminate the agreement, or take punitive action against the
other party (usually an individual whose endorsement or image is sought) in the
event that such other party engages in reprehensible behavior or conduct that
may negatively impact his or her public image and, by association, the public
image of the contracting company,
Fernando M, Pingúelo & Tim Cedrone, Morals? Wlw Cares About Morals? An Examination of
Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Need's to Know, 19 SETON H A L L J , SPORTS
&ENT, L, 347, 351 (2009),
' The term "talent," as used in this article, refers broadly to those individuals possessing
technical, creative, artistic, athletic, and/or other performance aptittides and to those in-
dividuals who obtain superior skills through edtication or training and encompasses en-
trepreneurs, executives, and anyone else whose skills and abilities are highly valtied and
sought after. The term also encompasses organizations whose purpose is to exploit the
skills and performance aptitudes of these individuals,
^ We recognize that no person is immune from allegations of immoral conduct. However,
prior to Thanksgiving Day 2009, Tiger Woods had been one individtial whose reputation
had rarely, if ever, been impeached in the court of ptiblic opinion. Lamentably, we mtist
use this pre-scandal prefix in front of Tiger Woods' name throughotit this Article becatise
of the abrupt, unexpected, and scandalous events that exposed this acclaimed athlete to
public outrage. His Thanksgiving Day 2009 suspicious car crash in front of his Florida
home and alleged affairs with women have "captured headlines," Johnny Diaz, Winning
Campaign Becomes Marketing Mess for Cillette, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec, 11, 2009, available at
http://www,boston,com/business/articles/2009/12/ri/sports_stars_antics_turn_gillettes
_winning_ad_campaign_into_a_marketing_mess/. As one sports commentator stmis up,
"Depending on what pedestal you placed Woods, we have lost a sports icon, a role model,
a bigger-than-life presence. So powerful was his reach that even something as ti ivial as his
shirt selection for, say, the U,S, Open would be featured in the tournament merchandise
tent," Gene Wojciechowski, Afler Tiger, In Wliom Shall We Believe?, ESPN,com, Dec, 17,
2009,
http://sports,espn,go,com/espn/commentary/news/stoi"y?page=wojciechowski/091217.
Wood's recent fall has already come at a steep price in endorsement deal losses, Gillette
has not aired a commercial featuring Tiger since November 29, 2009, Diaz, sujrra note 4,
Global consulting firm Accentuie PLG was the first major sponsor to "ctit ties altogether"
with Woods, Mark Williams, Accenture Becomes First Major Sponsor to Cut All its Ties with Tiger
Woods, MERCURY NEWS, Dec, 13, 2009, available at
http://stats,mercurynews,com/golf/story,asp?tour=EURO&i=2009] 213192469867813804
&ref=hea&tm=&src, AT&T Inc, also severed its sponsorship relationship with Woods; and
Swiss watch maker Tag Heuer "downscaled" its use of Woods' image in its advertising
campaigns. Associated Pre,ss, AT&fT Cuts Connection with Woods, ESPN,COM, Jan, 1, 2010,
http://sports,espn,go,com/golf/news/story?id=4784720. Logically, it follows that Accen-
ttire and AT&T have severed their relationships with Woods ptiisuant to a morals clause.
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to uphold its integrity as defined in the contract.^
In 2000, Enron, the Houston-based energy company, claimed
revenues of more than $101 billion and was named "America's
Most Innovative Company" by Fortune magazine for the sixth year
in a row.*^  Despite its colossal size and what appeared to be ex-
traordinary success, Enron "was not a household name,"' at least
from a national sports perspective. Shrewdly, a year earlier, Enron
had consummated a marketing and branding initiative to place
that reputational zenith within its grasp. Enron pursued a Major
League Baseball ("MLB") franchise and in April 1999, Enron
signed a thirty-year $100 million deal for naming rights to the
Houston Astros' new ballpark, to be named Enron Field. The As-
tros, like any talent who enters into a stadium naming-rights con-
tract, were placing a bet in the reputation lottery that Enron's in-
tegrity would shine for the length of the contract. A year later, in
2000, the Astros played their first game in their new stadium.
"Every" fan of MLB then "learned" the name "Enron."'
In a national headline-grabbing disintegration two years after
the Enron naming-rights deal closed, Enron filed what was then
the largest bankruptcy in American history.^ Since then, the word
"Enron" has been embedded in the national psyche and lexicon as
being the icon of corporate avarice and the perpetuation of a
Ponzi-type scheme'" on the public. The Astros paid a steep price
because of Enron's bankruptcy. The team spent the next two
months trying to buy out the balance of the naming-rights con-
tract for $2.1 million to erase Enron's name from the stadium -
" While a few sports lawyers and bloggers slate that reverse-morals clauses are proliferating
in endorsement contracts, we can fmd no publicly available examples of the names of the
parties or the language in such contracts. See Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
Annual Spring Symposium, http://cardozoaelj.net/symposium.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2010).
^ Ric Jensen & Bryan Butier, Is Sport Becoming Too Commercialised? The Houston Astros Public
Relations Crisis, INT'LJ. SPORTS MARKETING & SPONSORSHIP, Oct. 2007, at 23, 27.
Patrick E. Longan, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Covemance: Introduction 54
MERCER L. REV. 663, 663 (2003).
'Jensen & Butler, supra note 6, at 27.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission defines "Ponzi schemes" as:
an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing
investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers of-
ten solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to
generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraud-
sters focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage
investors and to use for personal expenses, instead of engaging in any legitimate
investment activity.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Ponzi Schemes - Frequentiy Asked Questions,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
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doing so just months before the season opener." The team had to
do this because thousands of "Astros-loving Houstonians" lost their
jobs at Enron,'^ leading to a "public relations nightmare"'^ for the
team. One public relations professional commented that the
"mud" from Enron would stick to the Astros for at least four or five
years and that the Astros would have to save themselves from the
"mess they created."'"
In their motion to compel, which was filed in federal bank-
ruptcy court to force a recalcitrant Enron to remove its name from
the stadium, the Astros used these sobering words to describe
their unique reputational crisis at the time:
Given the barrage of telephone calls and media inquiries the
Astros receive each day, it is clear that the name "Enron Field"
and the Enron logo displayed on the Stadium wrongly suggest
to the public that the Astros are associated with the alleged bad
business practices of Enron. As it stands, the Houston Astros
arguably are viewed as Enron's team. "
Astros' President Pam Gardner stated, "The Houston Astros
have been materially and adversely affected by the negative public
perception and media scrutiny resulting from Enron's alleged bad
business practices and bankruptcy.""^ A year after Enron filed for
bankruptcy, the Astros announced that Minute Maid would be-
come the new stadium naming sponsor. Since the value of sta-
dium naming rights typically decreases when the rights have to be
"rebranded" with a new name," the Astros likely absorbed addi-
tional damages because of Enron's financial and image problems.
The Houston Astros were not alone in being damaged by the
S««Jensen & Butler, supra note 6, at 23. For additional information on the matter, see
Joseph Blocher, School NamingRights and the First Amendment's Perfect Storm, 96 G E O . L . J . 1,
13 (2007) and Christopher MorafF, Recession May Change Came on Pricey Stadium-Bank Deals,
PHILA. TRlB.,Jan. 4, 2009, at Al.
" Blocher, supranote 11, at 13.
"Jensen & Butler, supra note 6, at 29-30 (referencing the Houston Bwinessjoumats quota-
tion of Houston Astros officials in describing their plight with tlie public over the team's
negative disassociation with the Enron scandal).
I' Id. at 30 (quoting Mike Paul of MGP & Associates PR).
" Christian M. Voigt, What's Really in the Package of a Naming Rights Deal? Service Mark Rights
and the Naming Rights of Professional Sports Stadiums, 11 lNTELL. PROP. L. 327, 342 (2004)
(quoting from the Houston Astros' motion filed in the Enron bankruptcy proceedings);
see also Notice of Presentment and Hearing on Motion by Houston Astros for Order Com-
pelling Enron Corp. to Assume or Reject License Agreement, In re Enron Corp., 2002
Extra LEXIS 46, at *18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2002). Voigt translates this bankruptcy
motion language into meaning that the public perceived Enron as being "responsible" for
the Astros "performance." Voigt, supra, at 342.
"Jensen & Buder, supra note 6.
Id. at 27 (quoting a sports marketing professional from an article by Marie Leone, Base-
ball, Apple Pie and Corporate Scandals, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3006938/c_9746]31).
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bankruptcies of corporate stadia-naming sponsors. The San Fran-
cisco Giants baseball team also did not want its fans to think that it
supported Enron and therefore asked the bankruptcy court to en-
join Enron to remove its logo from the Scoreboard at the Giants'
home stadium.'^ And, in less scandalous cases, where companies
that bought the rights for the stadia of the Baltimore Ravens (PSI
Net), St. Louis Rams (Trans-World Airlines), St. Louis Blues (Sav-
vis), and Garolina Panthers (National Gar Rental) went bankrupt
or out of business, the teams were compelled to buy back the nam-
ing rights, which can be costly, as reflected in the Baltimore Ra-
vens having to pay $5.9 million to the bankrupt PSI Net in 2002.'^
Tainted sponsors extend beyond the realm of bankruptcy.
Recendy the New York Jets and New York Giants broke off talks
with the German insurance company Allianz after the news media
exposed the "company's ties to the Nazis" during World War II,
just as the firm was poised to pay $25 to $30 million a year to have
its name on the new Meadowlands Stadium.^" In 2005, Seton Hall
University removed the name of former Tyco GEO L. Dennis
Kozlowski from an academic building that had borne his name for
eight years because the GEO had committed an Enron-stature
crime.
The foregoing episodes raise the need for talent to consider
a n d / o r seek and obtain reverse morality protections from corpo-
rate sponsors and to negotiate such reputation and financial pro-
tection into endorsement contracts.^^ In a world that continues to
"Jensen & Butler, supra note 6, at 29.
" The deal with PSINet called for the Ravens to receive $105 million over twenty years.
Kevin Cowherd, Farewell, PSINet Stadium - But What Name Is Next?, BALT. SUN, Jan. 28,
2002, at ID, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-01-
28/features/0201280041_l_stadium-purple-nest-i-have-heard.
'"' Moraff, supra note 11, at Al ; Richard Sandomir, What's in a Naming Right ? Gertainly Not
Gash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010, at B13. The naming-rights deal was expected to be one of
the largest, if not the largest, naming-rights deal in the country. Id. These ties included
Allianz insuring various Nazi concentration camps, including Auschwitz.
'^ Gollege Strips Off Kozlowski Name, CNNMoney.com, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/18/news/newsmakers/kozlowski_seton/index.htm.
Kozlowski was found guilty of stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from Tyco.
''''Most strikingly, the Houston Astros had to endure litigating a de facto morality issue in
bankruptcy court against a corrupt company. One legal commentator submits that the
Houston Astros would have saved themselves not only $2.1 million in payout money, but
also would have had the contracting leverage to terminate the contract had the Astros
simply required Enron to submit to a morals clause. See Daniel Auerbach, Morals Glauses
as Gotporate Protection in Athlete Endorsement Gontracts, 3 D E P A U L J . SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 16 (2005) (advocating that such a morals clause would be "a luxury" that could
"save a team significant time and reputational value by allowing them to dissociate them-
selves from a crooked company"). Equally cogent, Auerbach, citing the introduction of
morals clauses to Olympic sponsorship contracts, predicts that naming-rights agreements
might become ripe terrain for morals clauses. Id. at 15-16. In the context of the Houston
Astros being "Enron-ed," one sports management-media commentator recommends that
professional teams incorporate "ethics clauses into naming rights agreements associated
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expose Ponzi schemes and other corporate crimes and scandals,
there is an even more persuasive post-Enron^' reason for reverse-
morals clauses to become a standard provision in talent endorse-
ment contracts. Once a public linkage has been established be-
tween talent and a corporate brand, negative information about
either could result in a "damaged consumer evaluation of both en-
This Article sails into the largely unchartered waters of re-
verse-morals clauses because, to our knowledge, there are no law
review or law journal articles that substantially address this still nas-
cent area of law. Similarly, our research has not revealed any
with the corporate branding of stadiums, tiniforms, merchandise, and a wide array of
paraphernalia" in anticipation of naming rights sponsors falling into disrepute. Ric Jen-
sen, Essay: Public Relations Lessons from How the Houston Astros got "En-roned," 2 J. SPORTS
MEDIA 104, 107-08 (2007); se« aísoJensen & Butler, supanote 6, at 23, 27, 31 (arguing that
sports franchises might want to have a morals-type escape clause to terminate a staditim
naming-rights deal if another Enron occurs, and to be prepared for contingency planning
if a disaster like Enron erupts).
^' Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich described the financial semces industiy's dec-
ade-long, pre- and post-Enron malaise that eroded public trust as follows:
Over the past decade, several LI.S. corporadons came to symbolize betrayals of
public trust-Enron, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Tyco, HealthSouth, Sunbeam,
WorldCom, Waste Management, and ImClone, to name a few. Every major U.S.
accotmting firm either admitted negligence or paid substantial fines without
admitdng gtiilt. Nearly every major investment bank played a part in defrauding
investors, largely by urging them to buy stocks that the banks' own analysts pri-
vately described as junk.
Robert B. Reich, Covemment in Your Business, HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 2009, at 94, 96 (em-
phasis added).
* See Darin W. White et al.. The Effects of Negative Information Transference in the Celebrity En-
dorsement Relationship, 37 INT'L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MCMT 322, 323 (2009). This
source is the seminal empirical study that examined the impact of negative information
about the brand on the celebrity endorser. Id. at 324.
Only one law journal article devotes a paragraph to the basic concept of a reverse-morals
clause, although not naming that concept as a "reverse-morals clause" per se. See Daniel
Auerbach, supra note 22, at 16. Similarly, only three law journal articles, including the
foregoing one by Auerbach, comprehensively address traditional morals clauses. See also
Pingúelo & Cedrone, supra note 2, at 347; Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Tal-
ent Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical Cuide, 29 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS, 235, 236
(2005). Kressler notes that "there is no substantive scholarly research" on the subject of
morals clauses and "only a few cases interpreting" that type of contract provision. Id. The
most comprehensive and explicit coverage of the "reverse-morals clause" is found in a
piece in a British legal newsletter. See Christopher R. Chase, Morality, Reverse Morality and
Sir Allen Stanford, 7 WORLD SPORTS L. REP. (Mar. 2009) (anal>'zing the distinguishable
purposes of a morality and reverse-morality clause in the context of the alleged massive
f'raud committed by Sir Allen Stanford, the sponsor of several matches of the English
Cricket Board), available at http://www.simkins.co.uk/articles/azbStanford.iispx. This
piece is posted on the website of the law firm of Michael Simkins LLP Solicitors. Only a
handful of law blogs and law firm web site-type pieces even address the reverse-morals
clause, and that coverage is very brief. See, e.g., Christopher R. Chase, A Moral Dilemma:
Morals Clauses in Endorsement Agreements, Mondaq.com, May 21, 2009,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=79346; Brian R. Socolow & Jill Westmore-
land, What Every Player Should Know About Morals Clauses, 4 MOXTîS MAC, AUG. 2008, arjait-
able at http://www.loeb.com/files/Publication/0953bcf8-0747-44dc-ab71-
70e670d6285d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/70f8fe3f-a00e-4882-83da-
0096ecbab624/Brian%20Socolow,%20Moves%20Magazine.pdf (devoting one short para-
graph to reverse-morals clauses and noting that Enron was the genesis of these clauses);
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state or federal cases involving reverse-morals clauses.^^ Nor has an
actual talent contract containing such a clause been publicly re-
vealed, either in terms of language or the identification of the par-
ties to such a clause,^ although reportedly "an increasingly larger
number" of talent are now asking for reverse-morals clauses in the
wake of the Enron fallout and other high-profile corporate
wrongdoings that have left talent "in some cases receiving as much
negative press as the companies themselves. "^ ^ These issues merit
our attention because the morals clause and the "cutting-edge" re-
verse-morals clause are fast becoming "the most heavily negotiated
aspect of any sports or entertainment contract."^ Although, para-
doxically, there is little information on reverse-morals clauses
themselves, "there is no single subject (i.e., the morals clause and
reverse-morals clause) of greater import for the sports lawyer or
agent in today's brighdy lit sports environment." This Article
closes that gap in the legal literature.
Foley & Lardner LLP, Reverse Morality: Learn Insights on One Item that Properties Should In-
clude in Every Sponsorship Contract, A Q&A with Kirk Sullivan in The Migala Report, Oct, 1,
2004, http://www,foley,com/news/news_detail,aspx?newsid=994 [hereinafter Q&A with
Kirk Sullivan] (a short interview with a law firm senior counsel about reverse-morality
clauses). As far as law school symposia giving prominent coverage to the reverse-morals
clause, apparently two law schools have done so. In March 2010, the Cardozo Arts & En-
tertainment Law Journal held its Annual Spring Symposium, titled, "The Tiger Woods Ef-
fect: The Uncertain and Turbulent Future of Endorsement Deals, Morals Clauses and Re-
verse Morals Clauses? Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal Annual Spring
Sympositim, http://cardozoaelj,net/symposium,html (last visited Apr, 12, 2010), In
March 2008, the Second Annual National Sports and Entertainment Law Symposium was
held at the University of Virginia School of Law, Breakout Session III was titled "Morals
Clauses in Sports Contracts-A 2008 Primer," which solely covered both morals clauses and
reverse-morals clauses. Significantly, Associate Professor of Law Michael McCann, "a lead-
ing expert in the United States," was the moderator of this breakout session, which had
four panelists. For two brief comments about reverse-morals type clauses in the sports
marketing literature, see Jensen & Butler, supra note 6 at 27,31,
'" One case of note is Arbor Leasing LLC v, BTMU Capital Corp,, 68 A,D,3d 580 (N,Y,
App, Div,, 1st Dep't 2009), in which the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, re-
versed the lower court's grant of summary judgment. The lower court had found that the
defendant wrongfully terminated the consulting agreement between the parties pursuant
to the morals clause in the contract. This case is interesting in that it is one example, if
not the only example, of a morals clause dispute between two companies (as opposed to a
company and an individual) being litigated to the point of resulting in a published court
opinion,
A leading authority and scholar in sports law. Associate Professor of Law Michael
McCann of Vermont School of Law, opined in 2005 that no athlete had invoked a reverse-
morals clause yet, but it was "bound to happen," Robb London, The Natural: For Peter
Carfagna "79, Negotiation is a Professional Sport—and He's Been in the Zone, HARV, L, BULL,,
Fall 2005, available at
http://www,law,harvard,edu/news/bulletin/2005/fall/feature_4,php,
^^  See Q&A with Kirk Sullivan, supra note 25,
These quotes are from the brochure of the Second Annual National Sports and Enter-
tainment Law Symposium held at the University of Virginia School of Law in March 2008,
The quotes describe Breakout Session III, which was titled "Morals Clauses in Sports Con-
tracts-A 2008 Primer," which solely covered both morals clauses and reverse-morals
clauses. Sports Law Blog, http://sports-law,blogspot,com/2008/02/second-annual-
national-sports-and,html (Feb, 28, 2008, 16:22 EST),
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The Article begins in Part I with an examination of how the
traditional morals clause" begat the reverse-morals clause. We
briefly trace the history of morals clauses and how they evolved
into the flrst reverse-morals clause in 1968 with Hollywood celeb-
rity Pat Boone. Next, in Part II the Article analyzes the height-
ened need for talent brand protection in perilous and uncertain
economic times and explores the likelihood that the "Great Reces-
sion of 2008-2009"'^ and beyond will bring additional damage to
talent reputation in endorsement deals. Indeed, talent has good
reason to fear that a future Enron or Bear Stearns ' ' might be lurk-
ing across the endorsement negotiation table.
Offering a due diligence checklist for talent in prudently vet-
ting endorsement deals with companies. Part III raises a few red
flags. Special attention is given to the dubious reputation red flags
that celebrity golfer Vijay Singh faced in his recent endorsement
" The need to address talent's ofF-the-field conduct with traditional morals clauses has be-
come most acute in the NFL in recent years. Se« Porcher L. Taylor III & David R.
Maraghy, Pro Teams Should Reward Good Off-Field Behavior, 25 ENT. & SPORTS LAWYER
15(2007) (finding that off-the-field behavior is a "core subset of a team's brand equity," as
the NFL has been "overrun" with the arrests of some fifty players between 2006-2007); see
also Hannah Karp, Why the NFL Spies on its Players, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2008, at Wl (noting
that at least 57 NFL players had been arrested in the first ten months of 2008 and that
about 10% of the league's players on the 2008 rosters had been arrested during their play-
ing careers) ; Editorial, The NFL's Bad Actors, USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 2009, at 6A ("In Cincin-
nati, the hapless, halfway-house Bengals—nine players were arrested in 17 months in 2006
and 2007—rehired receiver Chris Henry last year despite five arrests."). In the sports
world, as in other areas of contract law, a morals clause does not necessarily terminate the
talent relationship, as sometimes these clauses "trigger a new round of negotiations." The
"decisive factor" may be whether the athlete is "hot right now" in terms of on-the-field per-
formance. London, supra note 27 (citing Peter Carfagna, a top sports layvyer).
'^  Prominent academic economist Nouriel Roubini at New York University Stern School of
Business uses this term to reflect the gravity and pervasiveness of the current recession in
his New York Times op-ed. Nouriel Roubini, Op-Ed., Does Benianke Deserve Another Term?:
The Great Preventer, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/opinion/26roubini.html. We likewise use this
term throughout this Article to describe the current recession with the short-hand term
"Recession," or recession with a capital "R." Prominent law and economics scholar and
jurist Richard A. Posner hails economist Roubini as being "the most emphatic of the Cas-
sandras" who foresaw the coming of the Recession. RICIIARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, 252 (2009). in
memorable prose in the preface of his book, Posner attacks any euphemistic descriptions
of this current Recession when he states.
The world's banking system collapsed last fall [2008], was placed on life support
at a cost of some trillions of dollars, and remains comatose. We may be too close
to the event to grasp its enormity. A vocabulary rich only in euphemisms calls
what has happened to the economy a 'recession.' We are well beyond that. We
are in the midst of the biggest economic crisis since the Creat Depression of the
1930s.
Id. at vii.
" Bear Sterns was arguably "ground zero" for the Creat Recession of 2008-2009. In spring
2008, Bear Stearns was America's fifth largest investment bank and the biggest under-
writer and trader of risky mortgage-backed bonds. When Bear Stearns imploded in 2008,
few could suspect that a "cascading collapse across the entire financial firmament" was
soon to follow. POSNER, supra note 32, at 252.
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deal with Stanford Financial Group and its CEO, Sir Allen Stan-
ford. Examination will also include some intriguing corporate
reputation research on whether illegal corporate behavior can ac-
tually be predicted in the context of due diligence. Part IV inves-
tigates whiat talent needs to know about reverse-morals clauses -
from talent's standing to demand such a clause, to innovative ne-
gotiation, draftsmanship, and enforcement tips. These negotia-
tion and draftsmanship suggestions seek to build "equal protec-
tion" into the endorsement contract. In creative fashion. Part TV
predicts the likely impact Twitter''^ and other similar real-time dis-
seminators of "news" will have on reverse-morals clauses."' We ex-
amine how Twitter might impact the negotiation of future tradi-
tional morals clauses and reverse-morals clauses.
Part V concludes the article, bringing the reader full circle
and re-emphasizing the relevance of reverse-morals clauses in to-
day's universe of endorsement contracts and talent agreements.
While the reverse-morals clause may seem a bit obscure today, in-
cluding one in talent agreements may quickly become the prudent
course of action for those seeking to secure protection against
corporate crimes and misdeeds. Thus, the importance of the
clauses should not be underestimated, and it is against this back-
drop that we begin our analysis into the origins and characteristics
of the reverse-morals clause.
" One lawyer uses the term the "equal protection" power to cancel the endorsement con-
tract in the context of drafting a reverse-morals clause. See Q&A with Kirk Sullivan, supra
note 25.
' ' Twitter is described as:
[A] privately funded startup with offices in the SoMA neighborhood of San
Francisco, CA. Started as a side project in March of 2006, Tvñtter has grown into
a real-time short messaging service that works over multiple networks and de-
vices. In countries all around the world, people follow the sources most relevant
to them and access information via Twitter as it happens—from breaking world
news to updates from friends.
Facebook Twitter Description, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52724239580|,last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
Twitter has rapidly evolved into an uncensored, self-promotion tool for talent to speak
directly to talent's fan base and for businesses to speak directly to their customers and
consumers. As a result, a minefield of communication errors, retractions, and embar-
rassments could await both talent and businesses in "Tvntter Land."
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I. How THE TRADITIONAL MORALS CLAUSE BEGAT THE REVERSE-
MORALS CLAUSE
A. The Origins of the Traditional Morals Clause: From Babe Ruth and
Hollywood Scandal-Plagued Stars in the 1920s to Athletes and
Entertainers in the Twenty-First Century
Traditional morals clauses in contracts first began appearing
during the first part of the twentieth century. During the 1920s,
employers began responding to the widespread increase in the
amount of attention paid by the press to the motion picture and
sports industries - and the scandals of the stars of those indus-
tries.^' More specifically, employers of entertainers and athletes
began incorporating morals clauses in employment agreements.
The two most prominent examples of this change in these indus-
tries are those of Ceorge Herman "Babe" Ruth and Roscoe "Fatty"
Arbuckle.
Babe Ruth is widely regarded as one of the best players to
have ever graceed a MLB field.'^ Ruth's reputation on the field,
however, may have only been matched by his reputation off the
field.'^ Indeed, Ruth has been described as a glutton, womanizer,
spendthrift, heavy drinker, and smoker."*" Ruth also regularly col-
lected speeding tickets, broke team curfews, and engaged in fist
fights with umpires, fans, and teammates."" Apparently recogniz-
ing the problems that Ruth's off-the-field behavior could cause for
a baseball team in an age of increased media coverage, the New
York Yankees introduced a clause similar to a morals clause into
Ruth's playing contract in 1922.^ ^ Ruth's clause with the Yankees
required him to abstain from drinking alcohol and to be in his
bed by 1:00 a.m. during the baseball season.""* Despite the pres-
ence of this provision in Ruth's contract, neither the Yankees nor
Ruth apparently followed it seriously."*"* Although this clause in
Ruth's contract was not a morals clause in the sense that it did not
explicidy allow the team to terminate his playing contract based
on "immoral" conduct, it serves as an early progenitor of the more
" Pingúelo & Cedrone, supra note 2.
"^ See Larry Schwartz, Lovable Ruth Was Everyone's Babe, ESPN.com,
http://espn.go.com/sportscentury/features/0001645Lhtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
" Id. (stating that Ruth "possessed an insatiable appetite for life").
" Robert M. Jarvis, Babe Ruth as Legal Hero, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 886 n.6 (1995).
Id. Ruth's collection of speeding tickets is particularly notable considering the time-
frame.
''Id.
" Id. (citing LAWRENCE S. RITTER & MARK RUCKER, THE BABE: A LIFE IN PICTURES 1-5
(1988)).
"Id.
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traditional morals clause. That is, it was a clause that allowed the
Yankees to take legal action against Ruth if he engaged in certain
proscribed conduct. Such is the essence of morals clauses today.
A year before the Yankees and Ruth placed this quasi-morals
clause in Ruth's playing contract. Universal Studios instituted a
new policy whereby all actors and actresses employed by Universal
Studios would be bound by a morals clause in their contracts.^*
Universal Studios began including a morals clause in its employ-
ment contracts because of a scandal involving one of the most
celebrated and beloved comedians in America at the time, Roscoe
"Fatty" Arbuckle.''
In 1921, Paramount Pictures signed comedian Roscoe
"Fatt^" Arbuckle to a three-year, $3 million contract.'" Later that
year, Arbuckle hosted a Labor Day weekend party in a San Fran-
cisco hotel suite, after which a female guest was found near death
in a bedroom.^^ After the guest's death a few days later, Arbuckle
was arrested on charges of rape and murder.^^ Arbuckle's arrest
turned public opinion against him and the motion picture indus-
try in general.'^" After observing the impact that Arbuckle's actions
had on its competitor. Universal Studios preemptively instituted
the aforementioned new policy of including morals clauses in con-
tracts.^' In fact, the attorneys for Universal Studios at the time is-
sued a pointed statement, saying: "As a direct result of the Ar-
buckle case in San Francisco, Stanchfield & Levy, attorneys for the
Universal Film Manufacturing Company, have drawn up a protec-
tive clause . . . to [be] inserted in all existing and future actors', ac-
tresses', and directors' contracts with the company."^^ Despite hav-
ing little to do with the Arbuckle case, or apparently having any
clients with similar issues at that time. Universal Studios nonethe-
less saw a need to include the clauses in its talent contracts to "re-
Morality Clause for Films, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1921, at 8, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9A02E0DC123EEE3ABC4A51DFBF66838A639EDE.
*'^ Dave Kehr, FILM; It's Not Over for the Fat Man, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at 2(11), avait-
able at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804EEDFlF30F935A25757C0A9609C8
B63.
" Kressler, supra note 25, at 236 (citing ROBERT H. STANLEY, THE CELLULOID EMPIRE: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY 180 ( 1978) ).
•** Id. (citing Sam Stoloff, Fatty Arbuckle and the Black Sox: The Paranoid Style of American Popu-
lar Culture, 1919-1922, in HEADUNE HOLLYWOOD: A CENTURY OF FILM SCANDAL 56 (Adri-
enne L. McClean & David A. Cook eds., 2001). The guest, twenty-eight year old actress
Virginia Rappe, died a few days later of peritonitis. Kehr, supra note 46.
Kehr, supra note 46. Arbuckle was eventually cleared of all the charges. Id.
" Kressler, supra note 25, at 236 (citing STANLEY, supra note 47, at 180, and Stoloff, supra
note 48, at 56).
See Morality Clause for Films, supra note 45, at 8.
2010] THE REVERSE-MORALS CLAUSE 77
assure the public" and "protect the company in an i n v e s t m e n t . . . .
" '^ As seen in the cases of Babe Ruth and Fatty Arbuckle, morals
clauses in employment contracts originated in the 1920s as a di-
rect consequence of the immoral actions of certain popular indi-
viduals.
The next step in the evolution of morals clauses occurred
during the McCarthy Era of die 1940s and 1950s. During that pe-
riod, morals clauses were often used to censor political conduct
and expression rather than challenge immoral conduct.^'' In 1947,
the House Committee on Un-American Activities (commonly re-
ferred to as "HUAC") served forty-three subpoenas upon studio
chiefs, directors, writers, and actors seeking their appearance for
hearings in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.^ '^  The forty-three
subpoenas yielded ten witnesses in October 1947, when HUAC
heard testimony from certain individuals deemed "unfriendly" by
HUAC.'^ *' These ten witnesses soon came to be known as the "Hol-
lywood Ten."" Widespread publicity followed the hearings, and
the House of Representatives cited the Hollywood Ten for con-
tempt of Congress in November 1947 based on their refusal to an-
swer HUAC's questions.'^ Thereafter, the studios invoked the
morals clauses in the individuals' contracts to terminate their rela-
donships with the Hollywood Ten based on their alleged commu-
nist leanings.'^ (Incidentally, three members of the Hollywood
Ten responded by filing lawsuits against the studios.)**
In the decades following the 1950s, the use of morals clauses
swung away from attacking polidcal ideologies and towards curb-
°' Id. The text of the 1921 Universal Studios clause read as follows:
The actor (actress) agrees to conduct himself (herself) with due regard to pub-
lic conventions and morals and agrees that he (she) will not do or commit any-
thing tending to degrade him (her) in society or bring him (her) into public ha-
tred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the
community or outrage public morals or decency, or tending to the prejudice of
the Universal Film Manufacturing Company or the motion picture industry. In
the event that the actor (actress) violates any term or provision of this para-
graph, then the Universal Film Manufacturing Company has the right to cancel
and annul this contract by giving five (5) days' notice to the actor (actress) of its
intention to do so.
Id.
" Auerbach, supra note 22, at 3 (citing David Rabinowitz & Helene Codin, What to do with
a Fallen Star: Voiding Endorsement Deal Can Be Legal Headache, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov, 14,
1994, at 30),
'''' Kressler, supra note 25, at 238 (citing STANLEY, supra note 47, at 128-31 ),
°^ Id. (citing STANLEY, supra note 47, at 130-31),
"id.
^ Id. (citing STANLEY, supra note 47, at 132),
Id.
"' 5ee Scott v, RKO Radio Pictures, Inc, 240 F,2d 87 (9th Cir, 1957); Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp, v, Lardner, 216 F,2d 844 (9th Cir, 1954); Loew's, Inc, v. Cole, 185 F,2d 641
(9th Cir, 1950),
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ing immoral behavior and protecting a company's image." Since
the 1980s, morals clauses have become increasingly common."^^ A
1997 survey conducted by Sports Media Challenge found that less
than half of all endorsement contracts included morals clauses.* '^
By 2003, this number had risen to at least seventy-five percent.*^
As of 2009, the collective bargaining agreements in the National
Football League,*^^ National Basketball Association,'^'' National
Hockey League,''^ and Major League Basebalf^ each contained a
uniform player agreement that included a morals clause. In re-
cent jears, morals clauses have been employed against Michael
Vick, ^ Kobe Bryant,™ Kate Moss," Rebekah Chantay Revels (Miss
North Carolina 2002)," Latrell Sprewell," Adam "Pacman" Jones,' '
Auerbach, supra note 22, at 3-4.
lid. ^
" Id. at 4 (citing Eric Fisher, Sosa Rap to Change Endorsement Deals, WASH. TIMES Tune 8
2003, atC03). •'
" Id. (citing Fisher, supra note 63, at C03).
'"Under the NFL Player Contract, § 11, a football club may terminate the player contract
"[i]f at any time, in the sole judgment of [the] Club . . . , [the] Player has engaged in per-
sonal conduct reasonably judged by [the] Club to adversely affect or reflect on [the] Club
. . . ." NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 252 (Mar. 8,
2006), available at
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/NFL%20COLLECTI
VE%20BARGAINING%20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf.
Under the NBA's Uniform Player Contract, § 16, a basketball team may terminate a
player contract
if the Player shall:
(i) at any time, fail, refuse, or neglect to conform his personal conduct to stan-
dards of good citizenship, good moral character (defined here to mean not en-
gaging in acts of moral turpitude, whether or not such acts would constitute a
crime), and good sportsmanship . . . .
National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, National Basketball
Players Association Web Site, at 183, http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005.
Under the NHL Standard Player's Contract, § 2(e), each NHL player agrees "to conduct
himself on and off the rink according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair
play and sportsmanship, and to refrain from conduct detrimental to the best interest of
the Club, the League or professional hockey generally." National Hockey League Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, National Hockey League Web Site, at 245,
http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf.
'^ Under the Major League Baseball Uniform Player's Contract, § 7(b), a baseball club
"may terminate [a player contract] . . . if the Player shall: at any time (1) fail, refuse or ne-
glect to conform his personal conduct to the standards of good citizenship and good
sportsmanship . . . ." Id. Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement, Major
League Baseball Players Association Web Site, at 217,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf.
Socolow & Westmoreland, supra note 25, at 187.70 , ,Id.
71 Kate Moss: Sorry I Let People Down, CNN.com, Sept. 22, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/09/22/kate.moss/index.html.
^^  Revels v. Miss N.C. Pageant Org., Inc., 627 S.E.2d 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
Auerbach, supra note 22, at 11 (citing Darren Rovell, No Ringing Endorsement from Corpo-
rate Sponsors, ESPN.com, Aug. 21, 2003,
http://espn.go.eom/sportsbusiness/s/2003/0718/1582783.html).
Liz Mullen, Only in Rare Cases Do Misdeeds Cost Athletes, STREET AND SMITH'S SPORTS BUS.
J., Sept. 17, 2007, aumTaife ai http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/56411. Jones
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and many others. On the whole, traditional morals clauses have
now become the norm in all types of talent agreements in the en-
tertainment and sports industries.'""*
B. The Tipping Point: 1968 - The Birth of the Reverse-Morals Clause
Morals reciprocity was born in 1968 when celebrity singer and
actor Pat Boone's thirteen-year contract with Dot Records expired.
Boone, a "genial southerner," was second only to Elvis Presley dur-
ing the 1950s in rock music popularity and obtained the respected
lifestyle-status of "the good Elvis.""^ Dozens of Boone's songs were
"hits."" At the age of twenty-three, Boone had cut a dozen single
records, sold more than thirteen million copies, and signed a $3
million, five-year contract for a weekly TV show. The Pat Boone
Chevy Showroom.'^ In a 1957 cover photo story in Newsweek
about the singer, the magazine noted Boone's faithful member-
ship in the Church of Christ, where he hewed to "church rules"
prohibiting smoking and drinking, even though this spiritual alle-
giance cost him sponsorship by alcohol and tobacco companies.
Pat Boone's high-profile righteous image and family life
paved the way for him to publish a best-selling teenage advice
book, followed by a sequel on romance advice. In an ironic twist,
Boone's own marriage fell into problems.*"' In his 1970 autobiog-
raphy, he revealed the hypocrisy in his life when he had, contrary
to his religion, gradually acquired the habits of drinking, smoking,
dancing, and later, gambling, even though his wife had given up
these first three vices at his insistence. Sometime thereafter,
Boone, "in an emotional confession" before a church congrega-
tion, embarked upon a "born-again" Christian path, and his wife
was soon to follow him down that path.
In 1968, Boone faced a "disastrous" financial crisis wdth his
H2
partnership purchase of a professional basketball team. At the
time, he also struggled with the direction in which his career was
headed. While he was content to let his multi-year contract with
Dot Records expire, Boone grappled in his conscience with
whether he should instead sign a deal with the record label of co-
was the first athlete against whom apparel company Reebok employed a morals clause to
terminate an endorsement contract. Id.
" See Pingúelo & Cedrone, supra note 2.
™ Joseph Reiner, Pat Boone - Contemporary Musicians, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 1995,
http://ww^v.encyclopedia.com/doc/lG2-3493100014.html.
"Id.
''Id.
''Id.
""Id.
" Id. Later in the 1970s, Boone, often \vith his family, recorded gospel albums. Id.
''Id.
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median and television star Bill Cosby, who at the time was a sig-
nificant entertainment industry figure.^' The following captures
the end result of Boone's moral and spiritual crisis:
[A]t the last minute Boone considered reneging, upset over
cover art for the [Bill Cosby] label's other new release: nude
pictures of John Lennon and Yoko Ono on the Two Virgins al-
bum. After much prayer, Boone, ready to opt out of the deal,
met with label executives. They were sympathetic to his reli-
gious concerns and agreed to a "reverse morals clause"—
Boone's contract would lapse if the record company, not the
performer, did something unseemly. Finally, it was agreed that
no formal contract would be drawn up. This was fortunate for
Boone, as a few months later the label went bust following
[Bill] Cosby's departure. ' '
Most significantly, Pat Boone's successful negotiation of an
oral agreement for a reverse-morals clause in 1968 is the first ref-
erence that we can find to such a clause in any talent agreement.^^
In Boone's case, his novel advocacy of a reverse-morals clause was
most likely achievable due to his iconic stature in the entertain-
ment world and his integrity aura in arguably a more conservative
era in American history. There was urgency for Boone's entreaty
for a reverse-morals clause because the nude photos on the record
jacket offended one of his core religious beliefs. The record com-
pany had little choice but to acquiesce to Boone's demand for re-
verse reputation insurance. Presumably, the record company real-
ized that with Boone there would be no compromise on his faith -
Boone's faith was deemed non-negotiable.
C. Corporations Behaving Badly: The Integrity Recession of 2008-2009
Unsurprisingly, a few legal commentators, mostly in the form
of law firm website articles and blogs, submit that the genesis of
the reverse-morals clause was the Enron catastrophe.*'' Undoubt-
edly, the highly-publicized saga of how the Houston Astros got en-
tangled in the Enron mess is the likely source for this school of
thought." In stark contrast to its façade of standing firmly on the
lid.
Id. (emphasis added).
'° Notably, the quoted encyclopedic reference to the term "reverse morals clause," supra
note 76, is dated 1995. Presumably, therefore, one can only speculate as to what the par-
ties to Pat Boone's oral agreement in 1968 called that provision in the talent contract, if
anything.
^^  See, e.g., Q&A with Kirk Sullivan, supra note 25; Chase, supra note 25.
These legal commentators do not refer to the Houston Astros episode as being the cata-
lyzing event for the need for reverse-morals clauses. Instead, the commentators just gen-
erically refer to the fallout from Enron. The Introduction of this Article specifically ana-
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high road of integrity, Enron abruptly and dramatically trans-
formed from poster child to a "bankrupt enterprise" in less than
three months in 2001.^^ The need for a reverse-morals clause be-
came something beyond Pat Boone's isolated demand for it in
1968.
By early 2008, the legacy of Enron and its progeny seemed to
become dimmer in corporate America's rear-view mirror as corpo-
rate crimes and scandals had seemed to be on hiatus. Only a few
prescient finance experts and economists were concerned that
something more pervasive than Enron was on the corporate repu-
tation horizon - the Wall Street shake-up and the Great Recession
of 2008-2009. The post-Enron era was now calling for more perva-
sive talent reputation insurance, in the form of a reverse-morals
clause. Given these considerations, it is imperative to examine
several common occurrences of which talent should be aware.
1. Talent: Beware of Corporate Bankruptcy as a Reputation Red
Flag
The Great Recession has triggered a flood of business bank-
ruptcies, and many more are expected.*^ Some of these bankrupt-
cies have become a lightning rod in the public limelight."" Talent
should prudently recognize that bankruptcy is a reverse-morality
warning sign and codify such a trigger in the reverse-morals
clause, which this Article takes up in Part IV, the draftsmanship
section.
2. Talent: Beware of Exorbitant Executive Bonuses
While Wall Street has gained notoriety for paying significant
annual bonuses to its top-performing executives and traders, the
unique saga of the bonuses paid at American Insurance Group
("AJG") played out before an irate nation wrapped in the throes of
lyzes the Astros-Enron encounter as the epicenter for the need to reboot the concept of a
reverse-morals clause after celebrity singer Pat Boone first introduced that contract provi-
sion in 1968. See supra Part I.B.
Id. For an authoritative and penetrating analysis of why public companies "falsely por-
tray" themselves to the capital markets in SEC filings and through other publicity efforts,
see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Themy of Wliy Corporations Mis-
lead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
On a year-to-year basis, business bankruptcies rocketed up twenty-four percent in Octo-
ber 2009 compared with the same month in 2008. Eric Morath, Business Bankruptcy Filings
Increased 7% in October, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2009, at B4, availréle at
http://online.wsj.com/arucle/SB10001424052748703932904574511733633191024.html.
One likely cause for this increase is that "[t]he margin for success is so thin that any fi-
nancial hiccup could cause a business to file for bankruptcy . . . ." Id. (quotations omit-
ted).
°° See Peter J. Wallison, Letter to the Editor, Too Big to Fail, or Succeed, WAI,LST.J.,June 18,
2009, at Al 7.
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the Great Recession of 2008-2009. AIG, the world's largest in-
surer, had a financial products division that was a veritable "giant
hedge fund," making "outsized bets" on risky derivadves."^ Presci-
ently, legendary investor Warren Buffett had warned that deriva-
dves were "financial weapons of mass destruction."^' As a result of
its risky bets on derivadves, AIG was forced to become a major re-
cipient of federal bailout money.^^
Against this backdrop, AIG still distributed $165 million in
long-planned retention bonuses to executives of its derivadves
unit. ° Striking a major blow to Wall Street's bonus-centric com-
pensadon system, Gongress swifdy intervened with "punitive tax"
legislation solely targeting those AIG executives as well as the tens
of thousands of employees at the nation's nine largest institudons
that had received at least $5 billion in assistance under Gongress'
$700 billion rescue package."" The legislation provided that those
execudves who received bonuses of more than $125,000 would
"surrender" ninety percent of their payments to a special income
For reverse-morals clause purposes, "exorbitant" executive
compensation will most likely continue to be a lightning rod of
public and regulatory rancor for companies in the U.S., even in
the eventual post-Recession era. By some accounts, the harm
done by financial services firms' pay pracdces could "plague" pub-
The scandal "angered the country," Brady Dennis, AIG Employees to Repay $50 Million in
Bonuses, WASH, POST, Mar, 24, 2009, at Dl, In all fairness to Wall Street, "virtually all Wall
Street employees receive bonuses," which in many cases make up the majority of compen-
sation, Shahagh Murray et al,. Congress Moves to Slap Heavy Tax on Bonuses: 90% Levy for
Biggest Payouts at Bailed-Out Firms, WASH, POST, March 20, 2009, at Al ,
"' See BARRY RITHOLTZ, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL
STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 204-05 (2009),
Editorial, If It's Too Big to Fail, It Deserves to be Regulated: Our View: Treasury Plan Marks
Logical Starting Point for Cutting Excesses, USATODAY, Mar, 27, 2009, at 6A,
See Murray, supra note 91,
''Id.
yd.
Id. Even President Obama felt obliged to weigh in on the controversy, stating that the
legislation "'rightly reflects the outrage that so many feel over the lavish bonuses that AIG
provided its employees at the expense of the taxpayers who have kept this failed company
afloat,'" Id. A co-sponsor of the "even tougher" Senate version of the bill declared that
"[bailed out companies like AIG] have to engage in more financially prudent behavior"
and that the Senate bill constituted a "dramatic" move toward "dismantling" Wall Street's
bonus system that had made banking and investment such highly profitable professions.
Id. See also Dennis, supra note 91, The AIG scandal prompted employee security concerns
due to growing public ire, AIG's CEO, in testimony before Congress about the bonuses,
alerted Congress to the fact that the company had received "threats," and New York At-
torney General Andrew M, Cuomo, who subpoenaed AIG to identify by name the employ-
ees who had received the bonuses, acknowledged that AIG had these 'security concerns,'
Murray, supra note 91, Rancor against the financial services industry extended well be-
yond bonuses. Northern Trust was "sharply criticized" for sponsoring a golf tournament
with "lavish side events," Tomoeh M, Tse, Bailed-Out Firms Post Expense Rules; $4 In-Flight
Movie? You're on Your Own, WASH, POST, Sept, 12, 2009, at A12,
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licly-held companies for "months and years ahead.""* Given this
on-going public and governmental scrutiny of executive pay, talent
should consider negotiating such a scandal trigger into a reverse-
morals clause. This Article takes up that question and analysis di-
rectly in Part III, the draftsmanship section.
3. Talent: Beware of a Recession Exposing a Spate of Ponzi
Schemes
In describing a natural benefit of recessions, the economist
John Kenneth Galbraith once remarked that "[r]ecessions catch
what the auditors miss."*^ Enter Ponzi schemes where initial inves-
tors are paid off with the influx of money from new investors.
Talent should not idly think that he or she could not fall prey to
such an insidious scheme. Likewise, one can consider that the
business-sophisticated likes of former Philadelphia Eagles owner
Norman Braman and current New York Mets owner Fred Wilpon,
both of whom were duped into a Ponzi scheme engineered by an
affable Wall Street icon by the name of Bernie Madoff. Braman
and Wilpon were part of a veritable who's who list of business and
charitable victims who got sucked into the vortex of Madoff s
scheme which was exposed in 2008. Others include the founda-
tion of Nobel laureate and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, GMAC
chairman J. Ezra Merkin, Yeshiva University, and North Shore-
Long Island Jewish Health System, along with numerous banks,
hedge funds, and other investment groups.
The "onetime Wall Street legend" Bernie Madoff led Ber-
™ Karen Dillon, The Coming Battle Over Executive Pay, HARV. BUS REV., Sept. 2009, at 94, 97.
Propitiously, the bailout era apparently came close to an end on December 14, 2009,
when Wells Fargo became the last of the largest U.S. banks "to msh though a repayment"
to the federal government before the end of the year. Eric Dash & Andrew Martin, Wells
Fargo to Repay U.S., a Coda to the Bailout Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at Bl.
'•"' Carlos Lozada, Bernie Madoff Evil Genius? That's fust Half Right, W/\SI-1. POST, Aug. 30,
2^09, at BL
™ For a short, but excellent, numbers-laden article on how a pyramid scheme, a "popular
variation" of a Ponzi scheme, actually works, see Willis H. Riccio, Ponzi Schemes: A Man
Called Charles, 58 R.I. B.J., July-Aug. 2009, at 8. Charles Ponzi, the Italian immigrant name-
sake of the Ponzi scheme, defrauded hundreds of investors often million dollars in 1919.
See]o\\n Steele Cordon, Pyramid Schemes Are as American as Apple Pie, WALL ST. ]., Dec. 17,
2008, at A21. Ponzi schemes are not necessarily of short duration. See Chad Bray, SEC
Charges Brooklyn Money Manager with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2009, at A6 (reporting that
a New York money manager was recently charged with operating a purported $40 million
Ponzi scheme that lasted for three decades and evidently helped finance a pornography
business).
"" For a list of the most prominent victims, see Peter Lattman & Aaron Lucchetti, Losses in
Madoff Case Spread-Alleged Ponzi Scheme's Victims Include Lautenberg, Zuckerman, Spielberg's
Charity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, at Al and Robert Frank & Tom Lauricella, 'Uncle Bernie'
and His Angry Clients-Madoff Created Air of Mystery, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2008, at Al.
David Lieberman et al.. Amazement Lingers at Madoffs Downfall, USA TODAY, Dec. ] 5,
2008, at 6B.
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nard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC for decades. Madoff
carefully cultivated a golden reputation over the course of forty-
eight years as a "pioneer" of electronic trading and the develop-
ment of the NASDAQ Stock Market, of which he was chairman in
the early 1990s.'°' Madoff had a record of seventy-two "winning
months in a row" and regular returns of about ten percent for
years, which according to one hedge fund expert was "like finding
the Holy Grail."'"^ Sometimes those "insane returns" reached
eighteen to twenty percent. The foundation of Nobel laureate
and Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, lost $15 million. In lamenting
that loss and betrayal of trust by Madoff, Wiesel said: "We thought
he was a god; we trusted everything in his hands."""' Madoff s dec-
ades-long Ponzi scheme came to an abrupt end in December 2008
when investors asked for $7 billion in redemptions."*
Bernie Madoff, "the biggest scam artist in Wall Street his-
tory"'"* pled guilty to "the world's biggest Ponzi scheme," having
bilked investors out of as much as $65 billion.'"^ As a conse-
quence, he received a 150-year prison sentence for his "extraordi-
narily evil"" crimes, as cited by the federal judge who imposed the
sentence. Auspiciously, Madoff s Ponzi scheme revelation in De-
cember 2008 created a silver lining amidst incredibly unfortunate
losses. Apparently, the shattering economy along with the major
headlines about Madofif combined to expose possibly more Ponzi
schemes within just a matter of weeks.'" The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, which shares with the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC") the responsibility for pursuing Ponzi scheme
leads, experienced a doubling of reported leads to such schemes
in 2008, and its enforcement caseload rose in 2009. The head of
the enforcement arm remarked that "[tjhere is no way for a Ponzi
to survive given the large number of redemptions and a lack of
Id. Madoff was deemed to be a "statesman" in the industry. Id. (quoting Marianne
Brown, CEO of Omego, a company that helps to affirm trades).
Id.
'°° Lozada, supra note 99, at B4.
2 Id.
'"' Lieberman, supranole 102.
'"" Lozada, supra note 99, at Bl.
"" Frank Ahrens, U.S Denies Report of Madoff Cancer, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, at A9.
However, it should be noted that a federal prosecutor review of most accounts held by
MadofFs customers when he was arrested in 2008 reveals that about half of the customers
had not lost money because they withdrew more money than they "originally" invested.
Associated Press, Review Says No Net Loss for Some in Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at
B7.
Lozada, supra note 99, at Bl.
Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs: Troubled Times Are Bringing More Ponzi Inquiries to Light,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at Bl.
'"Id.
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new investors." " Indeed, two months later in March, Bart Chil-
ton, commissioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, described the eruption as "rampant Ponzimonium," reveal-
ing that his agency had uncovered nineteen Ponzi schemes in
2009, as compared to just thirteen such schemes for all of 2008."^
The tally for the year 2009 was significant as the recession "unrav-
eled"; and nearly four times as many Ponzi schemes surfaced as
compared to 2008."'* Tens of thousands of investors lost an esti-
mated $16.5 billion, which figure does not even include moneys
lost from the Madoff scam.""^
From a federal regulatory standpoint, a Ponzi scheme should
be relatively simple to expose by merely having the SEC demand
"proof that the investment adviser holds the amount of money
the adviser claims to hold."' However, talent, in shopping for en-
dorsement deals, should not be lured into a false sense of^  regula-
tory, financial, or reputation security."* In particular, talent can-
not always rely on the SEC to preemptively expose and prosecute
Ponzi schemes. Tragically for Bernie Madoffs thousands of vic-
tims, since Madoff was an advisor to the SEC on electronic trading
issues, he was held in high regard by senior regulators at the
SEC. ' In a reputation-damaging "mea culpa"'""" SEC chairman
Christopher Cox publicly apologized for the SEC's failure to act
upon the "credible and specific allegations" that repeatedly came
into the SEC about Madoffs bogus investment returns.'^ In a
Reuters, Regulator: It's Ponzimonium,' CNNMoney.cotn, Mar. 20, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/0.S/20/news/economy/fraud_ponzi.reut/index.htm.
BusinessWeek reported that Ponzi schemes and other "investment scams" had tripled in
2009. Roben Farzad, The Asset Hunters, BUSINESSWEEK, July 6, 2009, at 38.
"'"' Curt Anderson, Ponzi Gollapses More than Tripled in '09 as Investors Lost About $16.5B, USA
Today.com, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/mark.ets/2009-12-28-ponzi-
schemes N.htm.
\yd.
"' Binyahim Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEG Didn't Act on Madoff Tips; Regulator
Was Warned About Possible Fraud as Early as 1999, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at D3.
'" Certainly, celebrities and professional athletes, many of whom are wealthy, may be vul-
nerable to Ponzi schemes, and are prime targets for them. For example, federal prosecu-
tors recendy charged a woman with running a Ponzi scheme in which she stole $3 million
from eight victims, including Michael Vick and two other NFL players. See Assocated
Press, Woman is Gharged in a Ponzi Scheme Involving Professional Football Players, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2009, at B2.
^Id.
™ Alex Berenson & Diana B. Henriques, S.E.G. Issues Mea Guipa on Madoff N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2008, at Bl. See also Stephen Labaton, S.E.G. Image Suffers in a String of Setbacks:
Missed Warnings in the Madoff Gase, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at B6.
"' Binyahim Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEG Ignored Gredible Tips About Madoff,
GhiefSays, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2008, at Dl. The SEC received at least six "warnings"
about MadofFs business over the years, including one that "explicidy" warned that Madoff
was probably "running a Ponzi scbeme." Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEG Outlines Madoff Lessons,
Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2009, at A22.
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"scathing" report by the SEC's own Inspector General, Bernie
Madoff himself told the internal watchdog that he was "aston-
ished" that the SEC did not verify whether Madoff Investment Se-
curities was carrying out the multi-billion dollars worth of trades
Madoff claimed to be making after he supplied the agency with
account details.'^^ The moral of this vigilance-lacking story is that
talent, with the support of lawyers, business advisors, and others
who comprise talent's team of trusted advisors, must conduct due
diligence probes into the bona fides of potential endorsees.
Other modern-day Ponzi schemes continue to unfold, includ-
ing those that involve talent endorsement deals. Former world
number one golfer Vijay Singh purportedly signed a five-year, $8
million endorsement deal with Houston-based Stanford Financial
Group in January 2009.'^ ^ From a superficial due diligence stand-
point, Stanford Financial Group appeared to sustain very high-
yielding certificates of deposit ("CDs") held in the company's bank
in Antigua for about 30,000 wealthy investors, mostly in the U.S.,
Caribbean, and Latin America.'^* The financial group was run by
its Texas-born owner and chairman, Sir Robert Allen Stanford, a
billionaire who made Forbes' annual list of the wealthiest people
in the U.S. '^ ^ A celebrity of sorts on Wall Street and in Antigua,
Sir Allen Stanford seemed to have a King Midas touch in wealth
management. As a return for Stanford Financial Group's investor
clients, his Antigua-based bank issued CDs that paid interest rates
that were more than twice the U.S. market average.'^'' Astonish-
ingly, these returns were sustained over the twelve-month period
of February 2008 through February 2009, when the U.S. stock
market and hedge funds lost astronomical amounts of value.'^
" ' Zachary A. Goldfarb, The Madoff Files: A Chronicle of SEC Failure, WASH. POST, Sept. 3,
2009, at Al. Most significantly, the SEC opened inquiries into MadofF five times in a six-
teen-year period. Id.
"' The Associated Press reported that Vijay Singh's endorsement deal with Stanford Fi-
nancial was worth $8 million. See Associated Press, Singh Offered to Pay Financier's Bond,
ESPN.com, June 26, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=4289707. But
see Kevin Eason, Fallout from Allen Stanford Affair Leaves Top Sportsmen Confused, THE TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2009, ttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/cricket/article5762814.ece (stating
that the five-year deal was for an estimated $5 million a year).
'" Tim Elfrink, The Rise and Fall of the Stanford Financial Croup; Castles and Corruption Lead to
Criminal Charges, HOUSTON PRESS, Apr. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.houstonpress.com/2009-04-09/news/the-rise-fall-of-the-stanford-financial-
group/.
" For the most illuminating and comprehensive coverage of the sordid rise and fall of
Stanford Financial Group and its chairman, see id.; see also Matthew Goldstein & David
Polek, Are These CD Rates Too Cood to be True? BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2009, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_08/b4120022131798.htm?chan=m
agazine+channel_top+stories. Alec Wilkinson, Not Quite Cricket, The New Yorker, Mar. 9,
2009, at 24.
"^  Goldstein & Polek, supra note 125.
'" Id
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Additionally, despite the then lingering bite of the global reces-
sion, Stanford Financial claimed to have increased the assets it
oversaw by thirty percent, to more than $50 billion.'^* In fact, the
wealth-management company touted that its investments lost a
mere 1.3% in 2008 - a year when the Standards & Poor index
dropped thirty-nine percent.'^** Sir Allen reported that one mutual
fund grew from ten million dollars to more than a billion in about
five years.'^^ In an apparent attempt to increase Stanford Financial
Group's respectability, in recent years, it had recruited former
Federal Reserve Governor Lyle Gramley as an economic advisor to
its research division.'"
The SEG initiated its invesdgadon of alleged GD fraud at
Stanford Financial Group in 2005, which was triggered by a whis-
de-blowing former company broker who claimed that the com-
pany was "running a Ponzi scheme.""^ About one month after
Vijay Singh sealed his lucrative endorsement deal with Stanford
Financial in January 2009, the SEC formally charged Sir Allen
Stanford, his GFO, and another company deputy with allegedly
orchestrating an $8 billion "massive Ponzi scheme.""' Four
months later, in June 2009, the Department of Jusdce unsealed its
indictment against the Texas billionaire and three other execu-
dves at Stanford Financial. A federal magistrate originally set bail
on Stanford at $500,000, but a federal judge a week later reversed
that ruling, declaring Stanford to be "a serious flight risk.""*^
Despite cogent public and discoverable red flags spanning
several years, Vijay Singh signed his main endorsement deal with
Stanford Financial Group in January 2009. Even after being con-
fronted sporadically by the media about his endorsement deal
with Stanford Financial, Singh appeared to continue to honor his
five-year contract with Stanford Financial Group and wore a golf
shirt and cap with a Stanford logo.
4. Talent: Beware of the Rapid Erosion of Public Trust in
2 Id.
Elfrink, íM/)ra note 124,
"° Wilkinson, supra note 125, at 27,
'" See Goldstein & Polek, supra note 125,
"^ Matthew Goldstein, SEC Dates Stanford Probe to 2005, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb, 27, 2009,
available at
http://www,businessweek,com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db20090225_898663,h
tm,
"' Elfrink, siipra note 124, The SEG in its twenty-five page civil complaint asserted that
Allen Stanford and the GFO kept ninety percent of the company's purported $8 billion in
investments in a 'black box' protected from outside scrutiny. Id.
'" Miguel Bustillo, The Stanford Affair: Stanford Ruled Right Risk, Denied Bail, WALL Sï, I,,
July 1,2009, at G3,
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Corporate America
The Great Recession of 2008-2009, the sudden rash of Ponzi
scheme exposures, and the shake-up of Wall Street and the auto
industry in Detroit have all combusted to erode public trust in
corporate America. Ominously, according to the annual poll
taken by the Edelman Trust Barometer, the year ending in 2008
was a record low for the ten-year period from 1998-2008 in Amer-
ica. A mere thirty-eight percent of "self-described" informed
adults in the U.S. said that they trust businesses, a decline of
twenty percentage points from 2007.'"' This "precipitous decline"
in business trust is global, with the Barometer finding that sixty-
two percent of adults in twenty countries trusted corporations less
in December 2008 than they had in 2007.'" This descent of trust
should concern strategists, as some researchers warn that "a low-
trust environment makes everything about doing business more
difFicuk. For an individual company, loss of trust leads to higher
transaction costs, lower brand value, and greater difficulty attract-
ing, retaining, and managing talent Ultimately, it can mean boy-
cotts, negative publicity, and unwanted regulation."''^
For talent already in an attractive endorsement deal or for tal-
ent in the hunt for new or better endorsement deals, the prospect
of companies suffering lower brand value, boycotts, and negative
Reich, supra note 23. A recent and unusually sharp rebuke by a federal judge under-
scores the descent of trust not only in corporate America but ajso in federal regulatory
bodies. Judge Jed S. Rakoff refused to approve a $33 million deal that would have setded
a civil lawsuit filed by the SEC against bailed-out Bank of America - a case that alleged that
the bank failed to adequately disclose the bonuses that were paid out by the foundering
Merrill Lynch before its merger with Bank of America in 2009. The judge, in his ruling,
"accused" the bank of blindsiding its shareholders and the American taxpayers and both
the bank and the SEC of "concocting the settlement to effectively absolve themselves of
further responsibility." Zachery Kouwe, Judge Rejects A Settlement Over Merrill Bonuses, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at Al, A23. On the same day of the judge's ruling, across town in
New York City, corporate America was on the receiving end of a presidential rebuke, as
President Obama made an unprecedented speech on Wall Street. President Obama de-
clared, "Hear my words: We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and un-
checked excess at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the ap-
petite for quick kills and bloated bonuses." Elisabeth Williamson & Damián Paletta,
Obama Urges Bankers to Back Financial Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A4. Al-
though some fmancial industry officials that were present at Obama's speech concurred
with the president's call for reform, "behind the scenes" fmancial companies have
"pushed" to marginalize or delay parts of Obama's reform package in Congress. Alexi
Mostrous Neil Irwin, ObaTrta Gets Stem with Wall Street, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009, at A12.
Reich, supra note 23, at 9. For a cogent commentary on how Bernie MadofFs $65 bil-
lion Ponzi scheme might have damaged American capitalism, see Anne Applebaum, Op-
Ed., Madoffs Scheme May Have Truly Damaged Capitalism, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2008, at
A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/15/AR2008121502393.html?nav=emailpage.
" Eric Beinhocker et al.. Strategy in The New World: The Ten Trends You Have to Watch,
HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 2009, at 55, 57.
™ Id. (emphasis added).
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publicity is not inviting, especially since endorsement opportuni-
ties (and therefore the ability to select the most reputable compa-
nies) are on the decline.
5. Talent: Beware ofthe Endorsement Deal Recession
Shopping around for a worthy endorsement deal suitor has
suddenly become much more difficult for talent during the Reces-
sion, particularly in the financial services, entertainment, auto,
and sports industries. State and federal regulators shut down
eighty-one banks in 2009, and federal regulators added 111 lend-
ers to their endangered banks list in the third quarter of 2009."^
Now stadium naming-rights deals involving the nation's largest fi-
nancial institutions might be in jeopardy due to possible interven-
tion by the federal government. Citigroup, the largest govern-
ment bailout recipient in November 2008, precipitated a scandal
of sorts, when it announced that it would charge ahead with the
costliest naming-rights deal in sports history vAth the New York
Mets, even though the financial giant had just laid off 52,000 em-
ployees and was treading water with almost $20 billion in losses for
2008."°
Several people criticized the Citigroup-Mets deal and other
bailed-out companies pursuing naming-rights deals. U.S. Con-
gressman Elijah Cummings (D-MD) railed: "This type of spending
is indefensible and unacceptable to Citigroup's new partner and
largest investor: the American taxpayer."''" The legislator called
on bailed-out companies to cease such "reckless spending," as
America "cannot continue to pour taxpayer dollars in buckets with
holes."'^^ In a stern rebuttal, Citigroup said that the Mets deal is
"an important marketing priority" and that it had no intention of
abandoning the contract. ""^  The future may still be up in the air
for the naming-rights deals for the three stadia in Philadelphia —
Wachovia Center, Lincoln Financial Field, and Citizens Bank Park
—as they all bear the names of bailed-out financial institutions.''*''
As for Hollywood, "the most escapist of industries" in a reces-
sion, the entertainment capital of the world has gone "haywire," as
'" Damián Paletta & David Enrich, Banks on Sick List Top 400, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2009, at
Al.
MorafF, supra note 11, at A5. The deal, signed in 2006, was for $20 million a year over
twenty years for Citigroup to place its name on the Mets' new ballpark, Citifield. Id.
'" Id.
Z '''••
Id. A more recent report has indicated that Citi attempted to find an escape clause in
the naming-rights deal with the Mets, but was unable to do so. Sandomir, supra note 20.
'" See Moraff, supra note 11, at A5.
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the number of deals for actors, musicians, directors, and other tal-
ent has dropped precipitously.''*'' For instance, movie franchising
is down because only about two banks, as compared to about ten
in the past, are actively financing independent films.""' With re-
cord sales down, musicians have been hurting, too.'^' The Holly-
wood mega-stars continue to thrive, but those who might have got-
ten $10 million on a deal are now being offered closer to $6
million or $8 million.'^^
Tiger Woods will no longer play in the Buick Invitational, an
event that he has dominated for years. Due to the court-
supervised Chapter 11 restructuring of General Motors, which is
Buick's parent, Buick and the PGA Tour announced in August
2009 the cessation of the Invitational.'''^ Endorsement deals on
the sports merchandise side have also been declining in the Reces-
sion, the best example of which might be shoes. Prominent sports
business reporter Darren Rovell correctly predicted that the top
shoe endorsement deals for NBA draft picks would not be more
than $1 million; in fact, the top deal plummeted to $750,000.'^"
Surprisingly, neither Nike, Adidas, nor Under Armour had made
any announcement about new deals as of June 2009.'^' Rovell saw
this novel situation almost like a Hobson's choice, stating, "This
leaves agents and players with a choice that top draft picks have
never really had. They can sign for any money they can get now or
they can have confidence in their ability and sign a deal when they
have some stats to add leverage to the game." ^^  In a subsequent
interview with Rovell, 2009 NBA top draft pick Blake Griffin, then
of the Oklahoma Sooners and now of the Los Angeles Clippers,
confirmed that the bad economy was causing a downsizing in the
dollar amount of endorsement deals.'^^
While talent may be in the midst of an endorsement drought
^ Amanda Bronstad, Hollywood Goes Haywire: Talent Boutiques Have Proliferated but Deals Are
Drying Up, NAT'L L. I., July 27, 2009, at 1.
' " M a t 8.
Id.
Id.
'* David Biderman, Heard on the Field . . . ; Buick Open Reaches the End of the Line, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 6, 2009, at D8. Buick also announced the termination of the Buick Open. Id.
Tiger Woods has had a lucrative endorsement contract with Buick since 1999. See GM
Ends 9-year endorsement deal with Tiger Woods, Nov. 24, 2008,
http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1861539,00.html (last visited Mar.
31,2009).
'™ Darren Rovell, Bad Year for NBA Draft Pick Shoe Deals, Sports Biz with Darren Rovell,
CNBC.com,June 24, 2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/31522493.
'" Id.
'"' Id.
'^' See Video Interview by Darren Rovell of Blake Griffin, Likely #1 Draft Pick, CNBC.com,
June 25, 2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=116S694741&play=l. Blake
Griffin confirmed the downsizing but hoped that the economy would improve. Id.
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because of the Recession, consulting firms that cater to the finan-
cial services industry appear to be searching for talent who can
help tout endorsees' Recession-recovery services. Pre-scandal Ti-
ger Woods was the most prominent talent in this business recovery
advertising field. Accenture Ltd., a well known global manage-
ment consulting company,''^ ran expensive full-page ads in the
Wall Street Journal and BusinessWeek, showing a very meditative
Tiger Woods stuck in the high grass, for example, looking down
confidently at his unseen golf ball In relevant part, the Recession-
themed advertisement's text ran as follows:
It's rough out there. Economic realities are daunting. And yet,
as with every competitive challenge, some businesses will re-
spond proactively and effectively, while others are left behind.
The winners will be those who act quickly, make the right deci-
sions and execute them flawlessly. From our work with the
world's most successful companies—through up cycles and
down—Accenture has developed the unique perspective and
broad capabilities to help you come out on top. At a time when
it's tougher than ever to be a Tiger, it's even more crucial to
know what it takes. Talk to us to see how we can help.''"'
II. T H E REVERSE-MORALS CLAUSE: SUGGESTIONS FOR A DUE
DILIGENCE CHECKLIST
With all of these new pressures to bear in the endorsement
deal arena, we now turn to how talent can best probe the bona fi-
des of endorsee company suitors: A due diligence checklist. By
performing all of tbe items listed on this checklist, the average
person of due diligence would likely identify whether the en-
dorsee company posed a risk to talent's reputation.
A. Simple, No-Cost, Quick, Accurate Due Diligence
Realistically, in the context of the reverse-morals clause, tal-
ent will neither be able nor expected to conduct the type of physi-
cal and personal due diligence that, for example, the NFL can
now exact upon the 1952 players it has under contract through its
aggressive NFL Security investigative unit.'**^  In order for it to be
'°* Tiger Woods has been the "centerpiece" of Accenture's advertisements since 2003, at a
cost to the firm of more than $65 million per year. Ghristopher Hosford, Marketers Playing
Through Pain of Losing Tiger, B TO B, July 14, 2008, at 4.
"' Accenture Full-Page Advertisement, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2009, at A9 (on file with au-
thors) (emphasis added). At the bottom right<orner of the ad is Accenture's logo with
the following statement Ijelow it: "High performance. Delivered."
"" This unit delves into the private lives of players. In a "sweeping" and "unprecedented"
effort to protect its brand by cracking down on any player behavior that is harmful to the
NFL's "integrity and reputation," NFL teams are hiring a "new breed" of security chiefs -
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of use to talent, a due diligence checklist must be both practical
and informative. Our research suggests that there is no real
checklist or best pracdces in either the advertising research or le-
gal literature that direcdy addresses this issue.'"
As a threshold matter in drafting a due diligence checklist for
a reverse-morals clause, we must examine whether unlawful corpo-
rate behavior can be predicted. Using data about court convic-
tions of the managers or employees of Fortune 500 companies,
management researchers have empirically tested whether such
corporate misbehavior is predictable.'''^ A study tentatively found
that firms with prior violations were more likely to commit addi-
donal acts because commitdng illegal acts "may teach" companies
how to further violate the law.
This corporate predictability research leads us to the first
item on our due diligence checklist. Talent needs to conduct a
decade or beyond corporate history search on any endorsement
suitors. The search into the corporate past should look for scan-
dals or civil and/or criminal violations. When public companies
are involved, we recommend a careful look at the quarterly (10-Q)
and annual (10-K) financial reports that publicly held companies
former police officers and FBI agents - and calling up extensive background checks, in-
stalling video-surveillance equipment in locker rooms, chasing down "rumors," and occa-
sionally forbidding players from speaking to the press. See Karp, supra note 31, For a most
informative look at how the NFL currently "spies on its players," see id. and Kate Thomas,
N.F.L. Role in Burress Incident Scrutinized, N,Y, TIMES, Dec, 4, 2008, at B14, Although the
NFL Security unit has been around since the 1950s and "low-profile," it has been recently
thrust into the media spotlight of controversy thanks to former New York Giants wide re-
ceiver Plaxico Burress' accidental shooting of himself Id. (noting that the NFL unit ini-
tially knew more than the police did about the suspected crime). This super-scrutiny fa-
cilitates the NFL's ability to rapidly and "summarily" fine and suspend players under its
new controversial personal-conduct policy launched in 2007, See Karp, supra note 31,
This new regime effectively rewrites the playbook on how the NFL can enforce morals
clatises against its players. Id.
The best analogue that we can find on this point is this paragraph from the retail man-
agement literature:
As a result of our findings, it is crucial that retailers be aware of the risks associ-
ated with using celebrities to endorse their stores and products. Given that our
results provide tentative support for the commonly held belief that a decline in
the celebrity's image can impact the image of the brand, it is important that re-
tailers carefully choose an endorser who currently has a good image and will
likely be able to uphold this image in the future. In other words, retailers
should closely evaluate a celebrity's overall character before associating their
brand name with a celebrity in order to protect their company's image. While it
is impossible to predict a celebrity's future moral or ethical actions, companies
should be aware of a celebrity's character weaknesses that could lead to future
problems.
White, supra note 24, at 331,
'^ Melissa Baucus & Janet P, Near, Can IUegal Corporate Behavior Be Predicted'? An Event His-
tory Analysis, 34 ACAD, OF MGMT, J, 9 (1991), Significantly, Baucus's and Near's article in-
tegrated theoretical contributions from a number of disciplines into a model of illegal
corporate behavior. Id. The research focused on cases where the courts ruled that the
firm was intentionally guilty of illegal behavior, not corporate wrongdoing. Id. at 11,
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must file with the SEC,"^° as well as the firm's own website. Both
public and privately held companies can be searched on Google,
Twitter, Facebook, and other similar resources.
Cyber-sleuthing of public filings and a company's own web-
site can pay nice dividends to the truly diligent in corporate repu-
tation research. For example, a "low-key" Venezuelan investment
analyst, Alex Dalmady, used solely this research tactic in helping a
friend determine whether his investment with Stanford Financial
Group was safe, after the Madoff scandal hit the headlines in De-
cember 2008."^' Literally, Dalmady took five minutes to conduct
his online search of Stanford Financial, whereupon he immedi-
ately called his friend back and exhorted to him, "Get your money
out. Now."" '^' This is Alex Dalmady's account of his five-minute
online investigation:
It wasn't just the balance sheets; there's one fishy thing after
another . . . I looked up [Stanford Financial Group's] board of
directors, and I see it's Stanford, his dad, and some other old
guy in Mexia [a town in Texas]. I looked up his address, and it
was on this cattle ranch in the middle of nowhere.
Dalmady's concern was echoed by a business professor at
Johns Hopkins University who has studied large-scale frauds and
has chided the balance-sheet focused SEC regulators for not being
attuned to the "most basic problems" at Stanford Financial Group,
such as a board of directors with eighty-five year old Mexia, Texas
cattle ranchers "at the top.""^ The professor, Phillip Phan, con-
tended that Stanford Financial might never have "built" such a
large Ponzi scheme had the SEC fully comprehended the simple
fact that the composition of the board of directors itself was a red
fiag."^^ Phan concluded that fraud regulation is more akin to CIA
all-source intelligence gathering, i.e., well beyond the myopia of
merely analyzing corporate balance sheets.
Regarding the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme case, there was
ample free information on the Internet that could have raised
'" One law professor surmises that some celebrities do proceed in a "cautious manner" in
the context of vetting products before signing endorsement deals. Se« Michael Maddow,
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125,
230 (1993) (suggesting that some talent probably test the laundry detergent of the en-
dorsee or examine the insurance company's books in an effort to protect talent reputa-
tion out of fear of personal liability in a deceptive advertising lawsuit). Id. at 230-31.
'"Elfrink, iu//ra note 124
'"^  Id.
'"' Id.
'""Id.
'"' Id.
""Id.
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fiags in that case, as evidenced by these simple insights of an in-
vestment executive:
Put simply, reputation and referrals are not good enough . . . :
Potential investors can check their fund manager's credentials
and verify certification with the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), which issues licenses for financial advisers.
FINRA also has background information on approximately
680,000 currently registered brokers and 5,100 currently regis-
tered securities firms.
Investors should also be on the lookout for potential confiicts
of interest."^ In MadofFs case, he served as treasurer of the board
of trustees atYeshiva University, which lost $110 million in Madoff-
advised investments.'""
B. Probing for Bankruptcy Red Flags
Just as any prudent company would conduct a credit and
bankruptcy search on an unfamiliar or unknown company with
which it sought to do business, talent should direct talent's agents
to do the same.""
A good place to start that inquiry might be to perform an
online Public Access to Court Electronic Records (more com-
monly know as "PACER") federal court filing search'^' or Google
search; or request information from a financial reporting service
about the company."^ Talent should not expect a corporate bank-
ruptcy to always be headline-generating news with the national
media, but word-of-mouth dialogue about a company's financial
Douglas J. Guth, Lessons Learned from Madoff Scandal, CLEVELAND JEWISH NEWS, Dec. 26,
2008, at 1, available at
http://www.clevelandjewishnews.com/articles/2008/12/26/news/local/doc49515b95453
ab345173173.txt (referring to an interview with Kris Putnam-Walkerly, founder and presi-
dent of Putnam Community Investment Consulting, Inc.).
Although it may seem intuitive, talent should care about the financial viability of a
company beyond whether or not the company can make the payments called for in any
agreement. Any financial instability or irresponsibility on the part of a company creates
the potential for a negative association between the company's financial irresponsibility
and the individual's image. For example, if a company files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, society may think that the endorser approves of the company's way of doing
business. As such, we include this section with this scenario in mind.
'" PACER is a service of the United States Judiciary and the PACER Service Center is run
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. PACER is an electronic public
access service that allows users to obtain case and docket information from Federal Appel-
late, District and Bankruptcy courts, and the U.S. Party/Case Index via the Internet. Links
to all courts are provided from PACER's web site. Electronic access is available by register-
ing with the PACER Service Center, the judiciary's centralized registration, billing, and
technical support center. See http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html.
"^  Two examples include Dun & Bradstreet (http://www.dnb.com/us/) and Bankruptcy
Crawler (http://www.bankruptcycrawler.com/).
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health is often captured via blogs, online commentary, and online
discussion forums. While headlines are certainly helpful, an
online search would be more comprehensive in helping to identify
the fmancial viability of particular companies.
Prudent due diligence is an acute necessity, particularly in
stadium naming-rights deals where more and more endorsee
companies either go bankrupt or defunct:
[T]he Baltimore Ravens, the New England Patriots and St.
Louis Blues are all in jeopardy of not getting paid for the nam-
ing rights on their homes. At best, they're risking major em-
barrassments because they may have to restructure their deals
or even change the names on their stadiums. At worst, they
lose out on a substantial sum of money if the companies whose
names adorn their facilities default on their agreements.
Ray Schaetzle of the National Basketball Association's New
Jersey Nets, as a caveat, states, "At the minimum, chief financial of-
ficers have to do credit checks on sponsors to make sure they are
worthy from a public relations perspective and financially
sound.""'* Amplifying this naming-rights theme, Minnesota Twins
president Dave St. Peter states that the Twins only seek good-
steward endorsee companies that "mirror" the same values of the
team, including "affordable" entertainment, community service,
and dedication to the fans.' ^
Talent should think twice about endorsing a company wdth a
failed business plan.'"' Talent may want to demand that question-
able endorsement partners sign more rigorous reverse-morals
clauses, with explicit terms indicating what constitutes unethical or
improper behavior.'" The goal is to try to avoid buyers that are
not only bankrupt in finances but also bankrupt in character. As a
corollary to talent protection in this context, talent should search
to make sure that a company has not been or is in serial bank-
ruptcy, often called Chapter 22 bankruptcy, which is "courthouse
'" See Jensen & Butler, supra note 6 (quoting D. Radin, Dot.com Bombs Do Some Damage to
Stadium Names, PriTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2001, at E-3).
"" Id. (quoting an article by M. Leone in CFO Magazine). Marie Leone, Baseball, Apple Pie
and Gorporate Scandals, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3006938/c_974613L
'" Id. (quoting an article byj. Vohmhof in The Minneapolis/St. Paul Business foumat). John
Vohmhof Jr., Teams Seek Partners for Naming Rights, Sponsorships, MINNEAPOLIS/Sï. PAUL
BUSINESS J., July 7, 2006, available at
http://milwaukee.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2006/07/10/focus2.html.
'™ See supta Part II.C.I of this Article for coverage of the "faux bankruptcies" of General
Motors and Chrysler.
' " Se« infra Part IV of this Article on Draftsmanship as to how the bankruptcy trigger
should be drafted into reverse-morals clauses.
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slang" for corporate "bankruptcy recidivism."''* This is "when a
Chapter 11 company returns back into bankruptcy because its re-
1 7 Q
organization failed."
C. Ask a Bank for its Leverage Ratio
If talent were to consider an endorsement deal with a bank,
talent's due diligence inquiry should include a query into the
bank's leverage ratio.'^^ Banking prudence should call for the lev-
erage ratio of debt to net capital to be twelve to one, meaning tbat
$12 was the maximum a bank could borrow for every $1 in capi-
tal.'*" Hyper-leveraging was tbe nucleus of tbe tumbling down of
Wall Street and the economy.'^^ Talent should tread cautiously
with banks wbo engage in hyper-leveraging.
D. Endorse a Company that Has High Corporate Reputation Rankings
Ideally, talent should especially consider endorsement deals
with companies tbat are highly rated in the corporate reputation
rankings. Examples abound.'* Business Ethics Magazine annually
ranks the top 100 companies for corporate social responsibility
See Experts Outline US Airways' Bankruptcy Options, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 12,
2004 (on file with authors).
"" Id. Companies that are in this recidivist gallery are LTV Steel, FAO Schwartz, Conti-
nental Airlines, and Greyhound Lines.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of debt to net capital.
'2 5«eRlTHOLTZ, supra note 92, at 143.
' ^ See Niall Ferguson, The Descent of Finance: Managing in the New World, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 2009, at 44, 47.
For the most comprehensive compilation of corporate reputation ratings lists, see
Charles J. Fombrun, List of Lists: A Compilation of International Corporate Reputation Ratings,
10 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 144 (2007). Fombrun notes that the majority of the hundreds
of lists that he has compiled were based on either a measure of overall reputation or of
the hospitality of the workplace. Id. For an excellent analysis of what some of the relevant
corporate reputation literature has to say about the interplay of corporate reputation with
corporate success, see Juan Manual de la Fuente and Sabate and Esther de Quevedo
Puente, Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Reputation and Financial Per-
formance: A Survey of the Literature, 2 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 161 (2003) (fmding empiri-
cal support for the reciprocal influence relationship between corporate reputation and
fmancial performance), Muel Kaptein, The Ethics Thermometer: An Audit-tool for Improving the
Corporate Moral Reputation, 2 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 10 (1998) (contending that a com-
pany's success is directly related to the "trustworthiness" of that company and a lack of
trust in a corporation can impede its "functioning"), and Rian van der Merwe and Ley-
land Pitt, Are Excellent Companies Ethical? Evidence from an Industrial Setting, 5 CORP.
REPUTATION REV. 343 (2003) (containing a study of the relationship between corporate
ethics and the concept of excellence). Compellingly, corporate governance agencies ex-
ert strong influence over the governance practices of public companies. See Thuy-Nga T.
Vo, Rating Management Behavior and Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Covemance
Rating Criteria, 34 IOWAj. CORP. L. 1, 30 (2008). The biggest and most influential corpo-
rate governance rating agency is Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS"), which rates
more than 8000 companies in thirty-one nations, using its Corporate Governance Quo-
tient. Id. at 4. Talent should note that this rating agency charges a fee of up to $17,000
per year for access to its ratings. ISS accomplishes its ratings by using its Corporate Gov-
ernance Quotient. Id. at 6.
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and stakeholder accountability.'**^ In similar reputation fashion.
Fortune magazine annually publishes its "widely read and re-
spected" list of "Most Admired Corporadons," which serves as a
standard of the most "financially sound" and civic-minded compa-
nies. Another Fortune listing to consider is its annual "The 100
Best Companies to Work For."
We offer a stark caveat here. Enron was named "America's
Most Innovadve Company" by Fortune magazine for six years in a
row."*'' While corporate rankings might be helpful tools for vetting
endorsement candidates, they are neither authoritative nor infal-
lible. Moreover, reports indicate that Enron's high rankings
might be partially attributable to the fact that Enron co-opted in-
fluendal members of the business media with money."*' Notwith-
standing these flaws, reading local newspapers and periodicals are
important parts of endorsement vigilance. Sir Allen Stanford's
own newspaper, the Andgua Sun, ran an article about him being a
great and humble benefactor, but the balanced piece included
some insights from his "detractors" that Stanford's true self might
eventually be exposed. This árdele was printed seven years before
the SEC uncovered Stanford's alleged muld-billion dollar Ponzi
scheme.
Returning to Vijay Singh's endorsement deal with Stanford
Financial Group, the Wall Street Journal ran an árdele with a
headline that read, "Top Lawyer's Withdrawal from Stanford Case
Waves a Flag." Even a layperson realizes that it is not every day
that a lawyer withdraws from a high-profile case. Indeed, the law-
yer, Thomas Sjoblom, was present at meetings where Stanford Fi-
nancial employees discussed how they had illegally used money,
and he was present when a senior executive denied criminal ob-
strucdon-ofjustice charges against her."*" Sjoblom promptly re-
signed and asked the SEC to disregard his statements on behalf of
Stanford Financial.'^' The tide of this Wall Street Journal article
™ SeeVo, supra note 183, at 27,
•" Patrick McLane et al,. Potentially Devastating Events: How Three Companies Managed and
Survived a Crisis, 2 CORP, REPUTATION REV, 268 (1999),
5œjensen & Butler, supra note 6,
See CNN Reliable Sources, Has Media Reported on Enron Scandal Responsibly?, CNN,com,
Jan, 26, 2002, http://transcripts,cnn,com/TRANSCRIPTS/0201/26/rs,00,html,
™ See Peter Fritsch, Antigua, Island of Sun, Is Also in the Shadow of II Allen Stanford, WALL Sr,
^^ Mar, 2, 2002, at Al, AlO,
See Kara Scannell, Top Lawyer's Withdrawal from Stanford Case Waves a Hag, WALL ST, J,,
Mar, 6, 2009, at C2,
Z ''^•
Id. Both Stanford Financial Croup's former lawyer, Sjoblom, and his prominent law
firm, Proskauer Rose, are in civil litigation hot water with a group of investor clients of
Stanford Financial, who have sued them for allegedly aiding a "massive investment fraud
scheme," Leigh Jones, Proskauer Hit with Suit over Stanford Work, NAT'L L,J,, Aug, 31, 2009,
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alone should give pause about the level of integrity of the buyer
that has hired talent to be an endorser of its product.
Rankings work both ways in that they can go up and down.
Talent must be attuned to a rapid drop in corporate reputation
rankings:
A precipitous drop in such rankings can signal a loss of the
public's trust in confidence in the company. This can then
translate into a detrimental fmancial impact on a company as
reflected in part by its shareholder value, which by defmition
includes the perception of a company's goodwill and its
brands.''^
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the corporate governance law
that was passed primarily because of the Enron implosion, essen-
tially mandates that public companies develop and have ethics
codes,'^' talent should search individual corporate web sites for
corporate values statements, codes of ethics, and codes of conduct,
to see if they and the prospective endorsee speak the same ethical
language.'^^ To further that pursuit, talent should consider seek-
ing out those companies that have Chief Ethics Officers. This po-
sition has become more prevalent at businesses in the wake of the
wave of scandals since Enron.
E. Beware of CEOs Who Make Hyperbolic Statements to the Media
Sir Allen Stanford, the CEO of Stanford Financial Croup,
made a character-revealing statement when he bragged to report-
ers that he was a direct descendant of the founder of Stanford
University. His hope was to brand his own name and that of his
namesake company with one of the most prestigious academic
brands in America. Unfortunately for him, his claim of DNA
pedigree was patently false. Stanford University was not happy
about this attempt at brand theft, and the university filed a lawsuit
against Stanford Financial Croup in October 2008, three months
before the SEC filed civil fraud charges against the company.'^''
at 6.
"" 5ee McLane, supra note 185, at 268.
Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act only requires public companies to disclose in
their SEC filings whether or not they have adopted a code of ethics for senior financial
officers. If a company has not adopted such a code, they must provide a reason to the
SEC for its failure to adopt a code. 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
See Fritsch, supra note 188. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not require an ethics code for
public companies.
' See Charles Fombrun & Christopher Foss, Business Ethics: Corporate Responses to Scandal, 7
CORP. REPUTATION REV. 284 (2004).
'* Press Release, Stanford University, Statement from Stanford University Regarding Stan-
ford Financial Croup, (Feb. 17, 2009), at/aifaWe a« http://news.stanford.edu/pr/2008/pr-
financialgroup-021809.html.
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Stanford University lamented the "confusion and reputational in-
jury" that it suffered due to the charges filed by the SEC'°' against
Sir Allen Stanford.
Since about eighty percent of financial statement fraud in-
volves a company's CEO or CFO,""* it is even more imperative that
talent keep a close eye on media statements made by senior lead-
ers in companies with whom talent are considering an endorse-
ment deal. Most notably, on the eve of Enron's collapse in 2001,
its senior leaders were visible cheerleaders in front of the media
and Enron employees, as they bragged that Enron was performing
strongly. The psychology and corporate law and governance lit-
erature warn of the pathological dangers of "narcissistic CEOs." "
CEO narcissism has the "potential to tear a company apart." '
III. REVERSE-MORALS CLAUSE DRAFTSMANSHIP
A. The Tiger Woods Effect: What Caliber of Talent Has Reputational
Standing to Extract a Reverse-Morals Clause?
Intuitively, from a contract negotiating leverage standpoint,
not all talent are going to have the high-integrity reputation and
high-performance success to be able to extract a reverse-morals
clause out of a sponsor company. Sponsors may resist the idea of
talent trying to impose upon them morals reciprocity. One enter-
tainment lawyer, speaking from experience, finds that a sponsor
will "never" offer up a reverse-morals clause but will concede to
such a clause if talent asks and presses for it.^ "' This is the thresh-
old test, i.e., whether a company will even agree to be bound by a
reverse-morals clause requested by talent. Who has the reputa-
tional standing to weigh in on this matter? We consider Pat
"^^  and pre-scandal Tiger Woods.
2
"" Marshall A. Geiger & Porcher L. Taylor III, CEO and CFO Certifications of Financial Infor-
mation, 17 Acer. HORIZONS 357, 358 (2003) (citing Roberto Ceniceros, Interest in Cmiem-
ance Drives Director Scrutiny, BUSINESS INS., Jan. 27, 2003, at 10,14). CEO reputation can
represent a "staggering" forty-five percent of a company's reputation, and eighty-one per-
cent of respondents in a survey said the CEO's reputation would influence their opinion
of a company under media scrtitiny. Leslie Gaines-Ross, CEO Reputation: The Nav Factor in
Shareholder Value, 26 DIRECTORSHIP 4 (2000). This reinforces the need for talent to hang
cautiously on virtually every public word and act of a CEO.
For a cogent article on this phenomenon, see Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-
Optimism, Fear, Anger, and Depression: T¡ie Interior Lives of Corporate Ijtaders, 77 U. CiN. L. REV.
405 (2008).
^; M a t 422.
Q&A with Kirk Sullivan, supra note 25.
•'"^  See supra Part I of this Article for a disctission of Pat Boone. In Part I, we discuss the
first reverse-morals clause, made in 1968, which was a byproduct of celebrit)' singer Pat
Boone's desire to keep his Christian faith inviolate in the face of the changing mores in
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Pre-scandal Tiger Woods, perhaps "the single most impactful
endorser in the history of sports marketing,"^"* was the quintessen-
tial candidate for extracting a reverse-morals clause from an en-
dorsee, assuming, of course, that the celebrity golfer did not al-
ready have such clauses from his many corporate sponsors. While
it is almost axiomatic in the advertising literature that consumers
will buy products whose "virtues" are praised by celebrities and
others, "'* Tiger had endorsement selling power beyond products.
Perhaps unlike any other talent, he literally had shareholder-
wealth or stock market-return generating power when he en-
dorsed sports apparel. Researchers have found a positive and sub-
stantial impact of Tiger's performance on Nike's excess returns,
implying that the market valued the additional publicity that Nike
received when Tiger, wearing Nike apparel, was in daily conten-
tion to win a golf tournament.
Despite the ability of certain endorsers to influence returns, it
would likely be somewhat difficult for most talent to convince a
sponsor to reciprocate morality - a scenario made even more dif-
ficult with the T'iger Woods scandal. One sports commentator has
asked who "will fill the void" left by Tiger Woods' "indefinite self-
exile" from golf?^ "** He compellingly surmises that the likes of
seven integrity-filled pro athletes from basketball, football, and
baseball could fill the void. ^^  Among the most likely to succeed
are Indianapolis Colts quarterback Peyton Manning, New York
Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter, and two-time Heisman Trophy
winner, Tim Tebow, the quarterback for the Florida Gators.^"^
B. Needed: A Corporate Rehabilitation or Probation Clause
As we discuss in the following paragraphs, talent with dam-
aged reputations can make an integrity-filled and successful return
the record industry. Boone's mega-stature in the industry forced the hand of the record
label to comply with his request.
™ Rich Thomaselli, Dream Endorser, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 25, 2006, at 1 (quoting Paul
Swangard, managing director for the University of Oregon's Warsaw Sports Marketing
Center).
"^^  Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends in the Law of Endorsement Ad-
vertising: Infomerdals, Gelebrity Endorsers and Nontraditional Defendants in Deceptive Advertising
Gases, 19 HOFSTRAL. REV. 603 (1991).
^^ Notably, this stock market-return effect may not apply when sports stars endorse finan-
cial service products, like American Express, rather than sports products. Id. (citing three
research articles) ; see also Stephen K. Koernig & Thomas C. Boyd, To Gatch a Tiger or Let
Him Go: The Match-up Effect and Athlete Endorsers for Sport and Non-Sport Brands, 18 SPORTS
MARKETING Q. 25, 35 (2009) (suggesting that the current industry practice of "linking ath-
letes who have no obvious match with the product category" (e.g., when Tiger Woods en-
dorsed the Buick car brand) might not be the most efficacious use of an endorsee com-
pany's resources).
' Wojciechowski, supra note 4.
""Id
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to the studio, theater, screen, or playing field. In certain cases,
fans and endorsers re-embrace these fallen icons. If such reputa-
tion restoration is attainable for talent, can reputation-damaged
companies make similar comebacks? If the answer is yes, then tal-
ent should be convinced of the need to draft a reputation-
rehabilitation or probation clause into both a traditional- and re-
verse-morals clause, with a time limit on the same.
First, to illustrate how talent can undergo a significant reputa-
tion rehabilitation, we turn to the example of Los Angeles Lakers
guard Kobe Bryant. According to sports business reporter Darren
Rovell of CNBC, Bryant completed "the greatest marketing"
comeback in the history of sports marketing in less than six years
after being criminally charged with sexual assault.^"" Rovell makes
the following case: in 2003, in reaction to the national media
storm that Bryant's scandal triggered, McDonald's, Coke, Spal-
ding, and Nutella did not renew their endorsement deals with the
basketball star. Nike stayed on with Kobe Bryant but put market-
ing of the player on hold. "
Bryant eventually climbed out of the lost reputation grave-
yard to make his comeback. Rovell asserts that he could list hun-
dreds of comments from pundits who said that it would be "impos-
sible" for Bryant to recover all of his pre-scandal endorsements.
Rovell cites as an example a comment made by Michael Levine,
the founder of Levine Communications, made shortly after the
news broke in 2003 about Bryant's alleged crime:
No matter what, if [Kobe Bryant's] found utterly and com-
pletely innocent, this will have been a September H"'-level of
tragedy to his image and reputation. There is no full recovery .
. . I cannot imagine companies wanting to be in long-term, ex-
pensive relationships with him no matter what happens.
In the intervening years, Bryant won the NBA's Most Valuable
Player award, scored eighty-one points in one game, and received
more adoration at the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics than his
endorsement rival, Cleveland Cavaliers star LeBron James '^** - all
while maintaining sterling conduct off-the-field.^'^ In the last two
Darren Rovell, Bryant is NBA's Most Marketable Again, Sports Biz with Darren Rovell,
CNBG.com, June 15, 2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/31367376 (hereinafter Brand is
NBA's Most Marketable Again).
Id.
'Id.
[Id
' Id. (emphasis omitted).
As far as incentivizing off-the-field good deeds, see Taylor & Maraghy, suffra note 31
(advocating that professional sports teams should consider paying athletes a bonus for
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years, Nike re-engaged Bryant by having him roll out its new Hy-
perdunk shoe. Moreover, Coke's Vitaminwater brand took Bryant
back, and Forbes' magazine's Celebrity 100, which ranks financial
and media power, placed Bryant No. 10 on its 2009 list, just be-
hind Brad Pitt and ahead of Will Smith, Michael Jordan, and
Lebrón James.^"^ Lastly, Bryant's jersey outsold all other NBA
players' jerseys in 2009, the second dme this has happened in the
last three years.
This is a remarkable quid pro quo that corporate America has
lavished recently upon Bryant because Bryant has been successful
in making the public, his fans, and endorsee companies "forget"
his alleged crime. While Bryant is now literally at the top of his
on-court and markedng game, few in the talent world could match
the kind of on-court heroics that he has displayed in the past six
years as he took his game to an even higher level and rebuilt his
off-court reputadon. Does this example mean that similarly situ-
ated talent must reach a Kobe Bryant-level of performance to gen-
erate this kind of recovery and rebound? This begs the question
of whether Tiger Woods or former Atlanta Falcons quarterback
Michael Vick can replicate the reputation restoration success of
Bryant.^'^ With Tiger Woods' return to golf in a major holding
pattern (as of March 2010), we turn our attention to Michael Vick,
the most recent sports figure to acdvely engage the center stage of
the rehabilitadon spoüight.
While the "moral implications" of the Philadelphia Eagles
signing Michael Vick will be "debated" for a long time, the "foot-
ball implicadons" are quite salient in that the Wildcat offense is
here to stay in the NFL. '^  The surprise, high-stakes return of Vick
to the NFL was a calculated tradeoff that the Eagles made between
the "reward" that Vick's "unparalleled improvisadonal skills"
would give the "Super Bowl-caliber" team and the anger that
Vick's post-prison debut from a dog-fighdng conspiracy sentence
generated among some Eagles' fans.^^ In an effort to preemp-
extraordinary citizenship ofT-the-field),
Bryant is NBA's Most Marketable Again, supra note 209,
"^' Comparing Michael Vick's potential reputation restoration to Kobe Bryant's successful
rehabilitation might be somewhat inapposite because the rape case against Bryant was
dropped by the state when the accuser was unwilling to testify. See Kirk Johnson, As Ac-
cuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Biyant Rape Case, N,Y, TIMES, Sept, 2, 2004, at Al ,
'"Judy Battista, With Vick, Eagles Up Ante on the Wildcat, N,Y, TIMES, Aug, 18, 2009, at B9,
The Eagles prudently signed Vick to a meager two-year, $1,6 million deal. Id.
^^  Id. Significantly, Coach Andy Reid is "one of the N,F,L,'s most innovative and aggres-
sive offensive minds," Id. One can question, therefore, whether Vick would have been
signed at all in the N,F,L, had not one team's need for innovation prevailed over player
infamy, SeeJeR Zillgitt, Reputation Restoration is No Ttuo-Minute Drill: Off and On Field, Vick
Must Pass Many Tests, USA TODAY, May 29, 2009, at lC, 6C (asking "V^o will take a chance
on Vick and be willing to withstand negative publicity and potential protests from animal
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tively disarm that fan rancor before Vick actually returned to the
playing field, the team sent a letter to its premium seat-holders, in
essence, asking them for "patience and understanding."^^'
Michael Vick's "catastrophic and very public fall" from sports
stardom^^^ is substantially different from that of Kobe Bryant. In
fact, it might be unique: "Few pro athletes have faced the daunting
confluence of predicaments in Vick's past, present and future.
Vick . . . lost his multi-million-dollar job, his freedom and his repu-
tation, and he's millions in debt."^^^
The contrition-filled Vick^^ ^ has to climb a steep hill to repair
his tarnished image because of the nature of the felony that he
committed. In the judgment of one crisis-management expert:
"'From a reputation standpoint, being inhumane is one of the
worst things you can commit in terms of being able to bounce
U 1 r -^ "'225
back from it.
Yet, Vick entered the Eagles stadium for the first time to a
"partial standing ovation" in a pre-season game, just three months
out of prison and the same day that he appeared in bankruptcy
court.^^ The fans "roared" when Vick "zipped" a thirteen-yard
completion in the first quarter.^" In fully reinstating Vick to play
for the Eagles in Week 3 of the regular NFL season (instead of the
anticipated Week 6 re-instatement), NFL Commissioner Roger
Coodell paid Vick a nearly hour-long personal visit and seemed
upbeat. He told the media, "'[t]his is a transition to hopefully
maximizing [sic] for him [Michael Vick] the opportunity to be
successful.'"^^^ The Commissioner moved up Vick's reinstatement
rights groups?").
^ Battista, infra note 224.
Zillgitt, supra note 220, at lC. Vick was a Pro Bowl quarterback with a $130 million con-
tract from the Atlanta Falcons. From that high perch he fell to serving eighteen months
in federal prison for a felony conviction for a dog-fighting conspiracy, and fell into a $20
million bankruptcy. Id. at lC, 6C.
^'' Id. at 6C.
For accotmts of Vick's remorse-filled press conference announcing his return to the
NFL through the Philadelphia Eagles, see Judy Battista, Soul Searching: Eagles Gingerly Em-
brace Vick, Who Quietly Shows Contrition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at B9, Les Carpenter &
Mark Maske, How Vick Got a Second Ghance in NFL, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2009, at Al, and
Michael Wilbon, 7 Won't Disappoint, "WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2009, at Dl.
•" Zillgitt, supra note 220. Notwithstanding this rather dire prediction, Vick's probation-
ary service specifically addressed the dog-killing. He was ordered to peri'orm community
outreach activities in Philadelphia with the Humane Society. Sííjariett Bell, Vick Cleared
for Third Week, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2009, at Cl. Equally fortunate for Vick, his on-going
rehabilitation mentor is former Indianapolis Colts Super Bowl-winning coach, Tony
Dungy. See Matthew Kaminski, A Coach's Faith: The Weekend Interview with Tony Dungy,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12-13, 2009, at A13. Sportswriter Michael Wibon hails Dungy as "the
quietest btit most credible man in football." Id.
^ ° Gary Mihoces, On Field, Vick Gets Six Plays, Positive Reception, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2009,
at Cl. In our view, for any athlete to perform under the dual weight of a prison sentence
and htige bankruptcy in a recession is extraordinary.
^" Id.
'"Judy Battista, Eligible to Play in Week 3, Vick Gives a Previeiu, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at
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by three weeks because Vick's return to football had gone "so
smoothly."^^" The lingering question on Michael Vick's career ho-
rizon is whether he will be able to pull off a Kobe Bryant coup in
restored endorsement deals. We predict that will largely depend
on whether Vick stays out of trouble.
Corporate America has played image rehabilitation from the
same crisis management playbook as that of Kobe Bryant and Mi-
chael Vick. Johnson & Johnson's rapid and prudent response to
the 1982 Tylenol poisonings "remains the gold standard in crisis
control." Seven people had died taking Tylenol capsules laced
with cyanide. Pharmaceutical industry experts sounded the
brand death knell to Tylenol.^'^ Johnson & Johnson went on the
"offensive" by launching a recall of 31 million bottles of Tylenol
and a "massive" public relations campaign to inform the public.^''
As a result of Johnson & Johnson's role model initiative, it re-
stored confidence both in the company and in Tylenol as a prod-
uct, ultimately bringing Tylenol successfully back to the pharma-
ceutical market.^'* Johnson & Johnson's reputation-restoration
progeny are plentiful. Among them are Exxon (an oil tanker
from the world's largest energy company ran aground on an Alas-
kan reef), Sears Roebuck & Company (California regulators for-
mally accused the company of fraudulently charging customers for
unnecessary repairs at its automotive centers), Texaco (publicly
contentious and embarrassing settlement of what was then the
largest class action racial discrimination lawsuit in history), and
Cadbury Schweppes (the world's largest confectionary company
had to recall some of its products due to a possible salmonella
contammation).
The foregoing establishes the need of talent to draft a reputa-
Bll .
Id. Vick's 2009 season was, by most accounts, mediocre. Frank Fitzpatrick, Vick Experi-
ment Seems Destined to End, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.philly.com/philly/sports/eagles/81082567.html. At times, Vick showed
glimpses of his past brilliance, and other times, he failed to live up to the hype his original
signing created. Id. What happens next in Michael Vick's professional football career
and his ongoing image reconstruction remains to be seen. Id.
™ Jia Lynn Yang, Getting a Handle on a Scandal, CNNMoney.com, May 22, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/05/28/100033741/i
ndex.htm.
^" Id.
2 Id.
^'' Id. Commendably, the company "assumed responsibility" for the safety of consumers
even though the firm was not responsible for the poisoning of its own Tylenol product.
See I A N I. MITROFF, MANAGING CRISES BEFORE THEY HAPPEN: WHAT EVERY EXECUTIVE
NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT 16 (2001 ).
2M.M17.
^^ See McLane, supra note 185, Conor Carroll, Defying a Reputational Crisis-Cadbury's Salmo-
nella Scare: Why Are Customers Willing to Forgive and Forget^ 12 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 64
(2007).
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tion-rehabilitation or probation clause into both a traditional and
reverse-morals clause. Given this, and mindful that only certain
individuals with high degrees of leverage will likely be able to se-
cure a reverse-morals clause, this Article now turns its attention to
the elements of an effective reverse-morals clause and considera-
tions in drafting one.
C. Reverse-Morals Clause Drafling Considerations
1. Prohibited Conduct
First and foremost, any effective reverse-morals clause will,
depending on the goals of the individual, specify which conduct
on the part of the company will trigger the clause. Most individu-
als will likely seek to secure a broad reverse-morals clause whereby
the individual may exercise his/her legal rights based on a wide
variety of improper corporate conduct. For example, such broad
language could prohibit "any conduct that brings the company
into public disrepute, hatred, scorn, or otherwise negatively im-
pacts the reputation of the company in the community."^' On the
other hand, talent, at the behest of the company, could agree to a
more narrowly worded reverse-morals clause. Such a clause would
identify the specific conduct proscribed by the contract. Such
language could prohibit "crimes of moral turpitude" or "violations
or convictions of laws." Talent should be cognizant of the troubles
that a broadly worded morals clause may pose in the event it is
ever triggered. For example, a broad clause may be sufficiently
vague to preclude the individual from seeking enforcement in
court.^" Consideration should also be given to whether the clause
will cover substantiated actions on the part of the company or
merely allegations of immoral conduct.
A final problem talent may face with a poorly drafted reverse-
morals clause is that such a clause could permit either party to
terminate the agreement if the company engages in the pro-
scribed conduct. Talent will therefore want to draft the clause in
such a way that he or she is the sole party who can invoke the
clause. Doing so will prevent a company that wants to terminate
™ See Kressler, sutrra note 25, at 256 (discussing similar language in the context of tradi-
tional-morals clauses)
" ' See Kressler, supra note 25, at 236. Although vagueness may prevent enforcement of a
morals or reverse-morals clause, courts have regularly enforced them. See, e.g-., Nader v.
ABC Television, Inc., 150 Fed. Appx. 54 (2d Cir. 2005); Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
240 F.2d 87, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1957); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d
844, 848 (9th Cir. 1954); Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1950). Based
on these cases, it is fair to say that morals clauses, and by extension reverse-morals clatises,
are generally enforceable, provided that they are drafted with specificity and clarity.
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the agreement from purposely engaging in proscribed conduct
and then subsequently terminating the agreement pursuant to the
reverse-morals clause.
2. Rights After Clause Is Triggered
A reverse-morals clause could specify talent's rights upon the
clause being triggered by the company's conduct. Such rights
could include talent having the option of terminating the agree-
ment or seeking damages or both. The issue talent would face in
seeking damages is quantifying the amount of damages they suf-
fered in dollars. However, this situation could potentially be re-
solved with a liquidated damages clause.^'^
3. Applicability to Related Entities and Individuals
This term goes to the scope of the reverse-morals clause.
Many companies consist of numerous subsidiaries and affiliates.
Even though a person may technically be associated with only one
company, his or her image could subsequently become associated
with all related entities of that company in the event of a corporate
scandal. As a result, talent would be wise to draft a clause so that it
covers not only the entity with whom he or she is contracting, but
also all companies related to or owned by the contracting party in
whole or in part. Stated another way, the clause should cover all
companies that own an interest in the contracting party and all
companies in which the contracting party owns an interest. Simi-
larly, one should also consider the scope of the clause in terms of
The enforceability of such a liquidated damages clatise will vary from state to state ac-
cording to that state's laws on the subject. In the context of employment contracts, liqui-
dated damages may be quantified in advance where the amount specified is proportionate
to the probable loss caused by a breach and actual damages are difficult to determine at
the time the parties agree to the contract. See, e.g., Bigda v. Fischbach Corp., 849 F. Supp.
895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the
Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 641-44 (2001). Notwidistanding various
state law differences, courts have generally looked at several factors in determining the
enforceability of a liquidated damages clause in employment contracts, including: sophis-
tication of the parties; representation by counsel; arms-length negotiation by the parties;
similar damages provisions in other employment contracts; intention of the parties to
provide for liquidated damages or a penalty; and the relationship of the damages amount
to any actual damages that may be sustained due to breach. See Bigda, 849 F. Supp. at 902;
DiMatteo, supra, at 641; Frederic L. Kirgis, Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem, 53 ALA.
L. REV. 421, 428 (2002); Mark A. Conrad, Mike Keenan's Power Play - A Slap Shot against the
Rangers and a Slap on the Wrist by the NHL, 5 SETON HALLj. SPORT L. 637, 653-54 (1995).
Effective negotiation of a liquidated damages clause in this context would necessarily ac-
count for these factors. Importantly, one should be aware that estimating damages to
one's reputation due to association with an immoral corporate entity may be difficult at
best, thereby giving rise to the distinct possibility that such a clause may not be enforce-
able.
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whether it will apply to individual employees of the company. It
may be in the individual's interest to draft the clause in such a way
that any immoral conduct on the part of company executives may
trigger the clause, regardless of whether an executive's actions oc-
curred within the scope of his or her official duties. Companies
will likely seek to exclude the acdons of individuals outside the
scope of their employment from triggering the clause.
4. Term
Talent should take into consideradon the reality that reputa-
tion-damaging corporate scandals could occur before the contract
is signed and then only be discovered after the contract is signed.
As such, talent may want to consider seeking a warranty against
both past immoral conduct and future immoral conduct when ne-
gotiating a reverse-morals clause. Talent may also consider
whether to attempt to secure a provision requiring compliance
with the clause after the agreement has expired, thereby allowing
the individual to potentially bring an action for damages long into
the future. Of course, the "term" component of a reverse-morals
clause should also specify that compliance with the clause is re-
quired for the duration of the agreement.
5. Reservadon of Rights
A reverse-morals clause should conclude v«th language re-
serving all legal rights and remedies available at law not otherwise
specified in the agreement. If a company agrees to a reverse-
morals clause at the outset, inclusion of this type of clause would
be unlikely to be met with resistance.
6. Future Consideradons and Technological Developments
During the drafting process, consideration should also be
given to future developments in technology, such as the advent of
Twitter. With the increased likelihood of companies demanding
that talent relinquish certain social media rights via a morals
clause,^'^ talent may similarly seek protecdon against companies'
improper use of social media and technology in a reverse-morals
clause. Such protecdon could take the form of a clause addressing
the medium through which immoral conduct is conveyed to the
public.
' SeeinfrafartW.
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7. Example of a Reverse-morals Clause
Taking the foregoing into consideration, we have formulated
an example of a reverse-morals clause meant for illustrative pur-
poses only. The clause below attempts to encompass each of the
aforementioned elements. However, it is drafted with reasonable-
ness as the goal, such that a balance is drawn between competing
240
mterests.
If Company should, prior to or during the term of this Agree-
ment, engage in any immoral or fmancially irresponsible con-
duct or any other conduct that might tend to bring Company
into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or which might oth-
erwise tend to reflect unfavorably upon Company, its employ-
ees, subsidiaries, or affiliated companies. Talent, and only Tal-
ent, will have the right to terminate this Agreement for cause.
Talent, and only Talent, will further have the right to terminate
this Agreement for cause if, prior to or during the term of this
Agreement, Company files for protection under any chapter of
the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., or
commits any felonious act under federal, state, or local law. If
the Agreement is terminated pursuant to this clause. Talent will
have the right to seek appropriate remedies at law or equity.
Talent reserves all legal rights and remedies not otherwise
specified in this clause.
IV. TWITTER: VIRAL TROUBLE FOR TALENT AND SPONSOR COMPANIES
The hugely popular micro-blog Twitter is claiming some
high-profile talent as social media casualties in the race to person-
ally, directly, and instantly connect with fans and followers in this
nascent, uncensored medium. Given the astronomical numbers
streaming forth from Twitter, it is understandable why so many tal-
ent have found this free service to be irresistible. Twitter is now
the third largest social network in the world, behind MySpace and
Facebook,^^' with about forty million users who each day produce a
"staggering" amount of short messages called tweets.^ "^ Twitter us-
ers spent nearly 300 million minutes on the site in April 2009.^"'
The Twitter world orbits around one simple question that chal-
lenges its users to answer in 140 characters or less, "What are you
Any perceived failure to include a specific element addressed previously in this example
is not meant to indicate that a reverse-morals clause should not include such element.
See Kelly Phillips Erb, Microblogmng: Is Twitter The New Blog? 31 PENN. LAWYER 34 34
^^uly-Aug. 2009).
Jon Swartz, More Marketers Sign on to Social Media: They 're Going Where Many of Their Cus-
tomers Hang Out, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2009, at Bl .
243 w- I ^
Id.
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domg?
Let us run through a few of the celebrity talent who are al-
ready on the Twitter "casualty" list. Shaquille "Shaq" O'Neal, the
NBA basketball star, was forced to become a Twitter user because
an Internet impostor used his name and was sending messages to
"unsuspecting" Shaq fans.^ '^^  In an exponential windfall for
O'Neal, more than two million Twitter followers rapidly flocked to
his site.^ "'' Shaq received a fortunate windfall, but it could have just
as easily gone the other way. The fans of Pittsburgh Steelers' quar-
terback Ben Roethlisberger had a false scare when Twitter, Face-
book, and MySpace all relayed messages that said that the quar-
terback had skin cancer.^"' In reality, Roethlisberger, like Shaq,
was not a user of these social media sites. Roethlisberger's agent
was left with the task of ensuring that the posts be removed from
^, 249
them.
In what might be "the most gracious exit in the raucous, in-
discreet, gaffe-ridden history of celebrity Tvwttering," George Ma-
son basketball coach Jim Larranaga, recently "retired" from Twit-
ter.^ *" The coach had made an "oblique" negative reference to an
NCAA rule on the amount of snacks coaches can offer players, and
commentators abrupdy picked up on his tweet to "heap mockery
on the NCAA."^ '^ ' Best-selling novelist Alice Hoffman had to pub-
licly apologize and shut dovwi her Twitter account after she vented
about a critical book review in the Boston Globe by calling a re-
viewer a "moron." '^^ ^ Gontroversial rock star Courtney Love was
sued for libel by a designer who Love called a "drug addict. "^ *^
Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban was recently fined by the
""Erb, íu/>ra note 241.
' " Howard Beck, The Real O'Neal Puts His Cyber Foot Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at
B16, available at http://www.nytimes.eom/2008/l l/20/sports/basketball/20shaq.html.
""Jonathan Berr, Sports Biz: Will the NBA Declare War on Twitter? DailyFinance.com, Sept. 4,
2009, available at http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/09/04/sports-biz-will-the-nba-
declare-war-on-twitter/. Kobe Bryant and Ron Artest are among the other top NBA stars
who have found Twitter to be a "cheap, easy means of self-promotion." Id. Apparently,
more than 700 professional athletes from various leagues have Twitter accounts. Inter-
view by Jennifer Ludden of Pablo Torre, Sports Reporter, Why So Many Athletes on Twit-
ter?, National Public Radio, Aug. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 12286202.
''" Ed Bouchette, No Cause for Alarm: Roethlisberger Denies He Has Skin Cancer, PinSBURGH
POST-CAZETTE, May 21, 2009, at Dl, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/09141/971734-66.stm.
^"Id.
"° Id.
^^ Amy Argetsinger & Roxanne Roberts, The Reliable Source: Coach Hangs Up His Twitter Fin-
gers, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2009, at C3. The writers of this piece note that the "social-media
craze" has become a "minefield for less cautious public figures." Id.
^^ ' Id.
"" Id.
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254NBA for $25,000 for using Twitter to criticize some referee calls.
Lastly, Miami Heat star Michael Beasley "caused alarm" recently
with attempted suicide tweets he posted that questioned whether
his life was worth living.^ ^^
Unsurprisingly, some professional sports leagues are fighting
back. The NFL and U.S. Tennis Association ("USTA") have re-
cently jumped into the Twitter fray with actual or potential sanc-
tions. The NFL imposed "pretty draconian restrictions" on Twitter
and Facebook banning social media posts ninety minutes before a
game and until post-game interviews are completed.^^'' Surpris-
ingly, those NFL restrictions also apply to the news media.^" In a
move that "angered" star player Andy Roddick, the USTA issued a
warning at the 2009 U.S. Open about tweeting confidential infor-
mation that could be helpful to gamblers in fixing tennis matches,
a long-time concern of the USTA.^ ^^  A San Diego Chargers player
was fined $2,500 for his tweet that said the training camp food was
"nasty."^"^ The Green Bay Packers banned its players from using
Twitter.^ **
With the Wild West of Twitter, franchises and sponsors are
left with no real checks and balances on the content of these in-
stant messages. Since Twitter is less likely to be "filtered" through
agents, publicists, or team officials,^" the "image-obsessed" NFL,
which is regularly hit with player off-the-field misconduct, fears
that it might not win the control game over Twitter.^ *^ ^ This fear is
a direct threat to both traditional and reverse-morals clauses.
Armed with Twitter, talent are just possibly one tweet away
Id.
255 ,- ,Id.
^ Berr, supra note 246. Both the NFL and NBA announced their Twitter policies before
the 2009 season began. Joe Librizzi, Why the NFL and NBA's Twitter and Social Media Poticy
is Wrong, BLEACHER REPORT, Dec. 18, 2009, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/311770-
why-twitter-and-social-media-policy-in-nfl-and-nba-is-wrong.
^' Berr, supra note 246.
*^  Id. On the eve of the 2009 U.S. Open, an upset Roddick, a former Open champion,
tweeted that he thought it is '"lame the US Open is trying to regulate our tweeting. I un-
derstand the on-court issue but not sure they can tell us if we can't do it on our own time .
. . we'll see.'" He added in another tweet, "'I definitely respect the rule about inside info
and on the court, but you would seriously have to be a moron to send "inside info"
through a tweet.'" Associated Press, Roddick Galls U.S. Open Twitter Warning 'Lame,'
NBCsports.com, Aug. 28, 2009, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/32603366/ns/sports-
tennis/.
*^' Mike Florio, Ghargers Fine Gromartiefor Twitter Gomplaint, NBCSports.com, Aug. 4, 2009,
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/08/04/source-chargers-fine-cromartie-for-
twitter-complaint/.
'^^  Paul Montgomery, Green Bay Packers Ban Twitter on the Job, THE INQUISITR, Aug. 2, 2009,
http://www.inquisitr.com/31651/green-bay-packers-ban-twitter-on-the-job/.
'" Rick Maese, With Twitter's Arrival, NFL Loses Gontrol of Image Game, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2009, at Al.
' ' ' /d. atAl,A18.
2010] THE REVERSE-MORALS CLAUSE 111
from scandal or a morals clause violation. As demonstrated above,
Twitter seems to have the potential to facilitate the proclivity of
talent to instantly become victims of fraud and the ability of talent
to defame or embarrass others, including their own teams or
sponsors. Lawsuits could likely follow. Veiled or explicit criticism
about sponsor products could erupt as well. Imagine if a major ce-
lebrity endorser impulsively sent a tweet to his fans that said that
he or she did not even use the product he or she endorses in TV
commercials. Could that possibly result in lost sales for the com-
pany? Would that be an actionable breach of a morals clause?
Exacerbating this effect is the technical fact that tweets have
a communication ceiling of 140 characters. This limitation is a
scandal waiting to happen because brief, informal statements are
often subject to interpretation, and consequently, the communica-
tion margin of error is greatly amplified by that limitation. Ac-
cordingly, it will be quite difficult for talent to retract a tweeted
statement or apologize in a coherent way. For instance, how does
Miami Heat star Michael Beasley convincingly and effectively con-
vey to his distraught fans that his recent tweet was not an exclama-
tory declaration that he was going to commit suicide?^ Teams
and sponsors, serving as the Twitter police, are going to find it dif-
ficult to handcuff such instantaneous and free social media.
As result of this Twitter talent predicament, we predict that
endorsee companies will demand that talent basically sign away all
of their Twitter and other social media rights in the form of lan-
guage to that effect in a morals clause. Reciprocally, talent may
demand that endorsee companies subjugate themselves to a simi-
lar provision. In rapid response to the Twitter explosion, market-
ers are scrambling to get on the social media bandwagon. Innova-
tively. Ford Motor Company has created a social media
management position and plans to introduce America to its Fiesta
subcompact car, not with a "massive ad blitz on TV," but by taping
100 top bloggers who have been given a Fiesta for six months.'' ^
The marketing quid pro quo is that once a month the bloggers are
required to upload a video on YouTube about the car, and they
are exhorted to talk "no holds barred" about the Fiesta on their
blogs, Facebook, and Twitter.^ °
The current social media wisdom is that these media can be
an "ideal forum for CEOs to offer customers a candid viewpoint"
'"'' Miami Heat star Michael Beasley's suicidal-sounding tweets included one stating,
"Feelin like it's not worth livin!!!!!!! I'm done." Sie Argetsinger & Roberts, supra note 250.
' " Swartz, supra note 242, at Bl.
'""Id
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without the need for a filter or "middleman." '^^ '^  This is precarious
thinking. Similar to the waidng trap described above for talent,
this type of unfettered dialogue is potendally fraught with embar-
rassment and lawsuit danger for any company. As a result, talent
should ensure that a prudent Twitter policy is in place at a sponsor
company not only as a matter of due diligence but also as part of a
reverse-morals clause.
Lastly, and maybe counter-intuidvely, the ubiquitous use of
Twitter might contribute to the current drought in the number
and dollar value of endorsement deals. Since nine in ten consum-
ers trust their peer consumers more than marketers,^*^' who needs
expensive TV commercials or ads anymore, with talent as the cen-
terpiece, to launch a new product? Twitter provides the market-
ing force, not talent. A growing cadre of marketers simply "can't
afford to ignore" millions of prospective customers who are "con-
suming media" in new venues.^ An author of a forthcoming
book on how businesses can capitalize on Twitter states, "Compa-
nies have no choice. This is where their customers are going."^ * "^
In the face of this potential adverse Twitter effect, talent might
consider a clause in their endorsement contracts that states that
their deal will not be obsolesced or marginalized by current or fu-
ture, yet undiscovered social media.
V. CONCLUSION
This Árdele has served as an invitadon to reputable talent to
reverse the negotiadon tables on endorsee companies and extract
from them reciprocal scandal-protecdon "insurance policies" in
the form of reverse-morals clauses. This is an essential and pru-
dent contract strategy in the new era of corporate crimes and
scandals in a recession-scarred world. The reverse-morals clause,
birthed in 1968 by a celebrity singer caught in the throes of the
clash between his orthodox religious faith and the changing mo-
res of the record industry, apparendy has lain dormant for three
decades. The Enron scandal in 2001 demonstrated the need to
"revive" it. Between 2001 and 2008, however, there has apparently
been no substandve discussion about these clauses either in the
legal literature, sports marketing literature, or the blogosphere.
In the post-Creat Recession world of endorsement deals (which
includes the growing prominence of social media ouUets), we
' Id. This data are from a recent survey by Nielsen, Id.
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think endorsers would be v«se to put reverse-morals clauses back
on the negotiation table. Undoubtedly, both the traditional mor-
als clause and reverse-morals clause are now the center of the en-
dorsement contract universe.
This Article has sailed into the largely unchartered waters of
reverse-morals clauses. Armed v«th the history perspective, cave-
ats, simple due diligence checklist, and contract drafting sugges-
tions outlined in this Article, both talent and their agents should
walk with confidence into the negotiation room. Although the
very idea of a reverse-morals clause would have been an oxymoron
more than forty years ago; today, this clause is vital for protection
against the harmful effects of the types of scandalous or criminal
behavior by an endorsee company that we have unfortunately and
repeatedly experienced since 2001.
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